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Inhibiting Patent Trolling: 
A New Approach for Applying Rule 11 
By Eric Rogers & Young Jeon* 
There has been an alarming rise in the number of litigious entities—commonly referred 
to as patent trolls or non-practicing entities—that make no products but file dubious 
patent infringement lawsuits merely to extract money from commercially productive 
companies. High litigation costs provide a fertile environment for an exploitive business 
model that uses shotgun tactics to threaten patent infringement claims against numerous 
companies, many of which will make a purely financial decision to pay patent trolls 
rather than expend even more money in litigation. Sometimes the payoff is a settlement 
strategically set below the likely cost of litigation defense. Other times, the payoff is a 
license fee too small to justify expending litigation costs to adjudicate, even if it is likely a 
frivolous claim. 
 
Patent infringement claims asserted by patent trolls are a type of nuisance lawsuit—a 
lawsuit in which the defendant pays to make the lawsuit go away simply to avoid 
expending the considerable costs associated with litigation, not because the lawsuit has 
any significant merit or chance of success. While nuisance lawsuits are not new, the 
direct, focused, and widespread negative effects of nuisance patent lawsuits on 
innovation and productive entities by those neither innovating nor producing anything 
make these lawsuits particularly damaging to society. In addition, the public’s negative 
perception of patent trolls filing baseless patent infringement claims endangers the 
legitimacy of the patent system as a whole. Most people agree something must be done, 
but there is little agreement on any specific solution, approach, or strategy. 
 
Yet one need only look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for a suitable remedy to 
help curb this vexing problem. This Article proposes a specialized implementation of 
Rule 11 to combat some of the unique difficulties created by the patent-trolling business 
model. A Rule 11-based solution is not only preferable to new legislation, but also 
complementary because it is 1) immediately available without any legislative action, 2) 
flexible enough to handle evolving behavior that exploits patent litigation inefficiencies 
through bad-faith patent infringement claims, and 3) strong enough to deter variations of 
patent-trolling behavior—whether conducted by a traditional patent troll, NPE, PAE, or 
even a commercially active entity. Broadly stated, this approach identifies patent-
trolling-predisposed claimants before the accretion of discovery costs and provides a 
swifter litigation exit ramp. The proposed inquiry treats all NPEs the same and analyzes 
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objective indicia as proxies for ascertaining the intent behind the entity’s litigious 
conduct. In sum, an upfront application of Rule 11 provides a less expensive escape route 
to end the most readily detectable patent infringement nuisance lawsuits. 
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INTRODUCTION 
¶1  There has been an alarming rise in the number of litigious entities—commonly 
referred to as patent trolls or non-practicing entities (NPEs)—that make no products but 
file dubious patent infringement lawsuits merely to extract money from commercially 
productive companies.1 High litigation costs provide a fertile environment for an 
exploitive business model that uses shotgun tactics to threaten patent infringement claims 
against numerous companies, many of which will make a purely financial decision to pay 
the patent troll rather than expend even more money in litigation. Sometimes the payoff 
is a settlement strategically set below the likely cost of litigation defense. Other times, the 
 
 1 See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 395 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An 
industry has developed in which firms use patents . . . primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”); EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION (2013) [hereinafter PATENT 
ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION REPORT], available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ 
docs/patent_report.pdf (“Suits brought by PAEs have tripled in just the last two years, rising from 29 
percent of all infringement suits to 62 percent of all infringement suits.”); RPX CORP., 2012 NPE ACTIVITY 
REPORT 12 (2013) [hereinafter RPX CORP. REPORT], available at http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/0BF995E82CFF591EE80EFE8AC69259E7.pdf (“In 2012, for the first time, NPE 
cases filed accounted for the majority of all patent infringement cases filed. The NPE share of cases filed 
has more than doubled since 2008. A substantial portion  of the increase occurred after the enactment of the 
[America Invents Act] and likely reflects a disproportionate effect of the [law’s] joinder rule on NPE cases 
filed.”); NPEs Have Broader Impact than GAO Headlines Suggest, RPX BLOG (Sept. 9, 2013) [hereinafter 
RPX BLOG], http://www.rpxcorp.com/NPEs-Have-Broader-Impact-Than-GAO-Headlines-Suggest; 
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-
services/publications/2012-patent-litigation-study.jhtml (last accessed Dec. 10, 2013) [hereinafter 2012 
PATENT LITIGATION STUDY]; see also James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J. Meurer, The Private and 
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26, 26–27 (2011–12) [hereinafter Bessen, The Private and 
Social Costs of Patent Trolls) (discussing how patent troll litigation makes up majority of total patent 
lawsuits filed); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the 
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1608–11 (2009) (reporting that non-practicing 
entities own the majority of the most litigated patents); Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent 
Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators?, 161 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1309 (2013).  
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payoff is a license fee too small to justify expending litigation costs to adjudicate, even if 
it is likely a frivolous claim. 
¶2  This exploitive business model, and patent infringement lawsuits brought by patent 
trolls generally, are facing increasing criticism.2 Complaints come from various corners, 
including small businesses, politicians, and lobbyists representing major corporations.3 
One of the main concerns with the rise of patent-troll lawsuits is the overall economic 
waste associated with this type of patent litigation.4 More importantly, patent trolling can 
needlessly increase the costs of using patented technologies and thus restrain the 
practicing of patented technologies.5 This contradicts the fundamental goal of the U.S. 
patent system—promoting technological innovation for society’s benefit.6 
¶3  During congressional discussion of proposed legislation, Representative DeFazio 
cited a study that concluded, “[P]atent troll suits cost American technology companies 
over $29 billion in 2011 alone.”7 President Obama decried patent trolls, saying they 
 
 2 See Randall R. Rader, Colleen V. Chien, & David Hricik, Op-Ed., Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 2013) [hereinafter Rader Op-Ed.], http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-
patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html (“The onslaught of litigation brought by ‘patent trolls’—who typically buy 
up a slew of patents, then sue anyone and everyone who might be using or selling the claimed inventions—
has slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses and consumers, and clogged 
our judicial system.”); This American Life: When Patents Attack!, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (July 22, 2011) 
(downloaded using iTunes). 
3 See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 461, 483–85 (2014).  
4 See John A. Amster, The Patent Troll Toll, INTELLECTUAL PROP. MAG., June 2013, at 34, available at 
http://www.rpxcorp.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/The-Patent-Troll-Toll.pdf (“On average, defendants 
stay in the case for less than 12 months before settling. This only reinforces the notion that, for all intents 
and purposes, these cases are transfers of value between patent users and patent owners. Using the legal 
system to make that transfer—and incur 50% of transaction costs—makes the tax on innovation far more 
burdensome than it needs to be.”). 
5 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND 
REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 67–68 (2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/evolving-ip-
marketplace-aligning-patent-notice-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade. 
6 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
7 See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
387, 412–13 (2014) [hereinafter Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes] (“Over a decade, the 
amount of NPE litigation has grown from less than 5% of all U.S. patent litigation to over 60%.”). 
However, an increase in the number of patent litigations by NPEs can be explained by the implementation 
of the America Invents Act changes to Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in September 2011.  
See RPX CORP. REPORT, supra note 1. The new procedural rule for joining defendants in patent litigation 
was designed to prevent patent trolls from suing dozens of defendants in the same case where there is no 
commonality between complaints other than the allegedly infringed patent. Thus, a status quo for the 
number of defendants in patent trolling litigation can now be better represented from the increase of 
independent cases. See id.; see also Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan, & David L. Schwartz,  NPE 
Patent Data Project, NPE DATA, npedata.com (last visited Dec. 10, 2013) (“[W]e find that most 
differences between the years—an increase in the number of patent holding companies and individual 
inventor suits—is likely explained by a change in the joinder rules adopted in 2011 as part of the America 
Invents Act.”); David Schwartz & Jay Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent 
System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 433 (2014) (arguing that Bessen and Meurer’s study was fundamentally 
flawed because their definition of patent trolls included individual inventors, universities, and entities 
intending to practice their patent(s) in the future); Mark Summerfield, A $29 Billion US Troll-Tax or Just 
Another Statistical Smokescreen?, PATENTOLOGY BLOG (June 29, 2012, 1:52 AM), 
http://blog.patentology.com.au/2012/06/29-billion-us-troll-tax-or-just-another.html; Do NPE’s “Cost” Us 
$29 B? Intellectual Ventures Co-Founder Peter Detkin Sets the Record Straight, GAMETIME IP (last 
updated July 17, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://gametimeip.com/2012/06/28/do-npes-cost-us-29-b-intellectual-
ventures-co-founder-peter-detkin-sets-the-record-straight/. 
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“essentially leverage and hijack somebody else’s idea and see if they can extort some 
money out of them.”8 The potential drag on the economy caused by the widespread use of 
the patent-troll business model has led Congress to consider new legislation that 
implements a one-way, “loser-pays” system for patent litigation. This system would 
require each NPE claimant to post bond for the full cost of defending a lawsuit before 
trial, and if a court finds that no infringement occurred, the NPE pays the defendant’s full 
legal costs.9 
¶4  Patent infringement claims asserted by patent trolls are a type of nuisance 
lawsuit—a lawsuit in which the defendant pays to make the lawsuit go away simply to 
avoid expending the considerable costs associated with litigation, not because the lawsuit 
has any significant merit or chance of success.10 While nuisance lawsuits are not new, the 
direct, focused, and widespread negative effects of nuisance patent lawsuits on 
innovation and productive entities by those neither innovating nor producing anything 
make these lawsuits particularly damaging to society. In addition, the public’s negative 
perception of patent trolls filing baseless patent infringement claims endangers the 
legitimacy of the patent system as a whole. Most people agree something must be done,11 
but there is little agreement on any specific solution, approach, or strategy.12 
¶5  Yet one need only look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) for a 
suitable remedy to help curb this vexing problem. One purpose of the FRCP’s Rule 11 
(Rule 11) is to discourage abusive litigation tactics.13 This Article proposes a specialized 
implementation of Rule 11 to combat some of the unique problems created by the patent-
trolling business model. A Rule 11-based solution is not only preferable to new 
legislation, but also complementary because it is 1) immediately available without any 
legislative action, 2) flexible enough to handle evolving behaviors that exploit patent 
litigation by using bad-faith patent infringement claims, and 3) strong enough to deter 
variations of patent-trolling behavior—whether conducted by a traditional patent troll or 
less predatory entity. 
¶6  Part I of this Article clarifies the patent-trolling business model and analyzes the 
unique ways patent trolls can manipulate patent litigation, settlements, and patent 
licensing. Part II explains the predominant proposals and tactics recently offered to 
inhibit patent trolling, which this Article predicts to be ineffective and/or indirectly 
weaken the patent system overall. Part III explains the current doctrine for imposing Rule 
11 sanctions for patent infringement claims. Part IV proposes a new implementation of 
 
8 PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. INNOVATION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. 
9 H.R. 845, 113th Cong. § 285A(a)(b) (2013) (leaving the bond amount to be determined by the court on 
a case-by-case basis). 
10 The nuisance lawsuit problem is not new. Adam Mossoff, The Rise and Fall of the First American 
Patent Thicket: The Sewing Machine War of the 1850s, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 165, 183–84 (2010) (noting that 
since the early 1850s, individual inventors have complained about corporations that refuse to pay fair 
license fees for their inventive works); see Matthew B. Wills & Neil Gold, Attorneys’ Fees in Litigation: 
Time to Discard the American Rule?, 4 LITIG. 31, 31 (1978) (“[N]uisance law suits are at the heart of the 
medical malpractice insurance crisis.”). 
11 See Matt Levy, Patent Progress’s Guide to Patent Reform Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (Mar. 4, 
2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/10/23/patent-progresss-guide-to-patent-reform-legislation/. 
12 See Improving the Patent System to Promote American Innovation and Competitiveness: Hearing on 
H.R. 3309 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rep. Bob Goodlatte, 
Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary). 
13 FDIC v. Maxxam, Inc., 523 F.3d 566, 586 (5th Cir. 2008). 
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Rule 11 to help immediately alleviate the problems caused by patent trolling through a 
mechanism that identifies patent-trolling-predisposed claimants and delays the accretion 
of discovery costs. The proposed inquiry treats all NPEs the same and analyzes objective 
indicia as proxies for ascertaining the intent behind an entity’s litigious conduct. This 
Article proposes an upfront application of Rule 11 as a less expensive escape route to end 
the most readily detectable patent infringement nuisance lawsuits. 
I. NUISANCE PATENT INFRINGEMENT THREATS:  
PATENT TROLLS AND PATENT TROLLING 
¶7  The prominence of intellectual property in the economy and its importance to 
businesses has dramatically increased over the past few decades. Similarly, this period 
has seen a rapid increase in the quantity of technological innovation across multiple 
industries, especially patented technologies related to products and services. Along with 
the rising prevalence, quantity, and value of patents, there has been a concomitant rise in 
rent seeking through the misuse of patent rights by entities pejoratively referred to as 
“patent trolls.” Patent trolls never plan to commercialize or practice their patents. Instead, 
patent trolls wait for others to commercialize technologies related to their patents so that 
they can later attempt to coerce the actual users of technology into exploitative license 
agreements or lawsuit settlements at exorbitant prices. 
¶8  Various factors have led to the proliferation of patent trolling. For instance, many 
point to 1) a lack of demand for products in a faltering economy; 2) an increase in the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office’s (USPTO) practice of issuing weak patents from the 
late 1990s until KSR v. Teleflex;14 and/or 3) the explosion of patenting computer-related 
business methods, such as “software patents,” and the subsequent growth in e-commerce 
applications following the State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group 
decision.15 In addition, some suggest that an inherently litigation-averse corporate culture 
has contributed to the rise of patent trolling, with company leadership favoring relatively 
inexpensive payoffs to avoid costly and unpredictable litigation.16 
 
14 See Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7; see, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, 
Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008); DAN L. BURK & MARK A. 
LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT (2009); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH 
LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING 
INNOVATION AND PROGRESS AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2004); NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE 
NAT’L ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, & 
Mark B. Myers, eds., 2004), available at www.nap.edu/html/patentsystem/0309089107.pdf. 
15 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants (Stanford L. and 
Econ. Olin, Working Paper No. 398, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1677785; see State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT 
LITIGATION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (2013) [hereinafter GAO Report]. After the State 
Street decision, software patenting jumped from 1,000 patents per year to 2,500 patents per year. See GAO 
Report, supra note 15. In more detail, the GAO Report found that by 2011, a majority of patents were 
software-related. Id. Also, from 2007 to 2011, the number of patent infringement lawsuits significantly 
increased. Id. For instance, just from 2010 to 2011, lawsuits increased 31 percent. Id. Further, between 
2007 and 2011, the number of defendants increased by 129 percent, 89 percent of which were software-
related patents. Id. 
16 Hon. Randall R. Rader, C.J., Fed. Cir., Address at the 27th Annual Intellectual Property Law 
Conference: E-Discovery in Patent Litigation—A Model Order to Quiet the Tail that Wags the Dog (Mar. 
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¶9  Patents can create value for their owners in many ways. Patent holders have the 
right to 1) monopolize markets by practicing their inventions while excluding others from 
doing so; 2) license their patent rights for remuneration; and 3) build a large patent 
portfolio as a defensive strategy to prevent patent litigation and to gain greater freedom. 
The first two ways are by far the most commonly exercised and involve the direct 
application of the patented technology in society. These strategies produce value based 
on real commercial markets for products and services. Monopolization allows the patent 
rights holder to use supra-competitive pricing in the marketplace; however, this pricing is 
constrained by economic factors such that other goods or services can become substitutes 
if the price exceeds an optimal market value. Similarly, the remuneration terms of 
licensing agreements often relate to the commercial value of the technology. And the 
defensive strategy gives the patent rights holder the option to assert patent infringement 
counterclaims when others assert patents against them, which both deters patent lawsuits 
and encourages cross-licensing arrangements between competitors. 
¶10  In contrast, patent trolling is a type of patent monetization that relies solely on 
patent infringement litigation, or at least the threat of litigation, to create value for a 
patent holder.17 A patent-trolling business model creates value by leveraging the threat 
and cost of patent infringement lawsuits to obtain settlements and license fees.18 In the 
United States, the default rule (the American Rule) is that each party pays its own legal 
fees, which encourages more nuisance lawsuits and quick settlements before litigation 
costs substantially accrue.19 In sum, patent infringement lawsuits filed by patent-trolling 
entities are a type of nuisance lawsuit in which the accused infringer is often financially 
compelled to pay to make the lawsuit go away just to avoid exorbitant litigation costs, not 
because the claim has much merit or chance of success.20 
A. The Patent-Trolling Problem 
¶11  Patent trolls are a type of patent-asserting entity (PAE) typically classified as NPEs 
and/or patent aggregators.21 Many characterize the patent-trolling business model as 
 
2012) [hereinafter Rader Address to AIPLC]. 
17 A famous example of a patent infringement nuisance lawsuit is a non-practicing entity’s use of the 
Lemelson patents for barcode scanners to threaten hundreds of companies with litigation, eventually 
resulting in over $1 billion in license fees for the NPE. See Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & 
Research Found., 301 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Nev. 2004), aff'd, Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., 
Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005), amended on reh'g in part sub nom. Symbol 
Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Educ. & Research Found., LP, 429 F.3d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
18 “Patent holders frequently assert that another party is using a patented invention, and for a fee, offer to 
grant a license for such use. . . . [P]arties receiving such licensing letters have a strong incentive to pay up 
even if they believe they are not engaged in infringement.” 150 CONG. REC. E1935 (daily ed. Oct. 11, 
2004) [hereinafter Rep. Berman statement] (statement of Rep. Berman). 
19 One exception to this default rule is that federal appellate courts may impose that the losing party pay 
the prevailing party for damages caused by frivolous litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1912.   
20 See generally Ranganath Sudarshan, Nuisance-Value Patent Suits: An Economic Model and Proposal, 
25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159 (2008). 
21 “In 2001, Peter Detkin, then vice president and general counsel at Intel Corporation, stated that a 
‘patent troll is somebody who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not practicing and have 
no intention of practicing and in most cases never practiced.’” Shaun McVicar et al., “Who’s that Walking 
on My Bridge?”: Navigating ‘Patent Troll’ Activity in the UK and Australia, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=56d0d62a-7656-42ec-a14f-cd38e7f5aaff. See, e.g., ACACIA 
RESEARCH CORP., http://acaciaresearch.com/about-us/#history (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (“Acacia and our 
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simply another form of rent seeking. Patent trolls often collect never-practiced, never-
licensed, or never-asserted patents in order to assert claims against established businesses 
that might have been unknowingly infringing those patents for years.22 In many instances, 
the patents are overly broad and thus invalid to some extent, if not in their entirety, or the 
patents do not cover the allegedly infringing activity. Nonetheless, even if a targeted 
business believes that the patent infringement claim lacks merit, they often choose not to 
litigate and settle for paying a patent licensing fee because litigation costs are 
prohibitively expensive. In other words, the mere threat of patent infringement litigation 
is the patent troll’s most effective weapon in this exploitive, rent-seeking business model. 
¶12  A patent-trolling strategy’s success largely derives from the high legal costs 
associated with defending against a patent infringement claim, even if simply to get the 
claim dismissed at the summary judgment stage. Patent litigation has become one of the 
most expensive and time-consuming types of commercial litigation, which further 
amplifies the pressure to settle or pay a licensing fee.23 This increasing cost drives the 
growing popularity of the patent-trolling business model, and makes patent infringement 
lawsuits one of the most lucrative forms of modern nuisance lawsuits. Moreover, the 
average cost of patent right acquisition and assertion is far less than the average cost of 
defending against patent infringement claims, further incentivizing entities—often funded 
by recirculated revenue from previous rounds of patent trolling—to actively search for 
and purchase patents for patent trolling purposes. Lastly, the large quantity of unused, 
overly broad patents; the notice-pleading rule; and the default American Rule have 
created an environment for patent trolling to flourish.24 
¶13  The U.S. legal system generally disfavors a cost-shifting scheme based on who 
wins a civil suit.25 However, 35 U.S.C. § 285 (the Patent Statute) provides cost shifting 
for “exceptional” cases where the court may order the patent infringement claimant to 
pay the prevailing party’s legal fees.26 But this harsh penalty has been used only 
 
patent partners have signed more than 1,200 licensing agreements with many of the world’s largest 
companies.”); CONVERSANT INTELLECTUAL PROP. MGMT. INC., http://www.conversantip.com/our-
portfolio/ (last visited Oct. 13, 2014) (maintaining over “12,000 patents and applications under 
management” at the entity formerly known as Mosaid Technologies); INTELLECTUAL VENTURES MGMT., 
LLC, FACT SHEET (2014),  available at http://www.intellectualventures.com/assets_docs/IV_Corporate_ 
Fact_Sheet_Sep2014.pdf (“With more than $6 billion committed capital and more than 40,000 IP assets in 
active monetization programs, we own one of the world’s largest and fastest growing intellectual property 
portfolios . . . .”); ROUND ROCK RESEARCH LLC, http://www.roundrockresearch.com/ (last visited Oct. 13, 
2014); see also Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012). 
22 See Robert P. Merges, The Trouble with Trolls: Innovation, Rent-Seeking, and Patent Law Reform, 24 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1583, 1590 (2009). 
23 See Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7. 
24 See Stanley Clark, The Risks and Costs of Patent Litigation: A House Counsel’s View, 315 UTAH L. 
REV. 618, 618 (1973) (discussing “the protracted nature, enormous risks and the inordinately high costs of 
patent litigation”).  
25 See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal Theory of Attorney Fee Shifting: A Critical Overview, 31 DUKE 
L.J. 651, 652 (1982). See generally Philip M. Payne, Costs in Common Law Actions in the Federal Courts, 
21 VA. L. REV. 397 (1935). 
26 35 U.S.C. § 285 (stating attorney’s fees may be awarded for “vexatious or unjustified litigation or 
frivolous suit”). The purpose of the “exceptional” case statute has been described as compensation to the 
prevailing party for its legal costs. See Cent. Soya Co. v. Geo. A. Hormel & Co., 723 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. 
Cir. 1983). 
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sparingly, and judicial precedent has defined the contours of what constitutes an 
exceptional case narrowly.27 
¶14  Even if a business suspects that the lawsuit is baseless, justifying unpredictable 
litigation costs is difficult when parties can so easily eliminate this threat by paying the 
patent troll a sum far less than the cost of successfully defending the lawsuit. Often, the 
commercial value of a patent does not correspond with the dollar amount of settlements 
or license fees because exorbitant legal costs distort the patent’s actual value. 
Consequently, the cost of litigation can dictate settlement amounts and license fees 
instead of traditional marketplace economics related to the value of the patent.28 Thus, 
some patent license fees represent an economic inefficiency as compared to their actual 
commercial value—creating significant, legally created, deadweight loss in the 
economy.29 
¶15  When a business encounters the threat of patent litigation, it has three main choices 
besides ceasing the allegedly infringing activities: 1) design around the threatened patent 
claim(s); 2) negotiate and obtain a patent license; or 3) litigate hoping the court will find 
the threatened patent invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed. Litigation is often 
undesirable because of high legal costs, uncertainty associated with construing patent 
claims, unpredictability of jury verdicts, and potentially negative effects on share prices.30 
In addition, deciding to design around a possibly invalid patent may not be wise because 
of considerable research costs, the uncertainty regarding a successful design-around, 
and/or the interruption of business operations during an indeterminate period.31 That 
leaves the quick and easy choice—pay the license fee and continue with business as 
normal. In other words, if the patent infringement claim is seemingly dubious, and the 
license or settlement fee is strategically set below the cost of litigation, then a company is 
likely facing a patent-troll “shakedown” fee.32 
¶16  Based on the current patent litigation system, it is often economically efficient to 
settle some patent lawsuits as quickly as possible to avoid legal costs. Litigation expenses 
average nearly $5.5 million for cases with more than $25 million at risk, and $650,000 
for cases with less than $1 million at risk.33 It can cost over $3 million and take eighteen 
 
27 Since the creation of the statutory “exceptional” patent case in 1952, there have been about 3,300 
cases that cite the “exceptional case” statute.  Westlaw search, WESTLAW, https://a.next.westlaw.com 
(search “35 U.S.C. § 285”; then click the “citing references” tab; then click the “cases” tab) (last searched 
Aug. 18, 2014). Of these, 2,409 cases were at the district court level, 858 cases were heard before the 
Federal Circuit, and 15 cases were heard before the Supreme Court of the United States. Id. 
28 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON.  PERSP. 75, 87–89 (2005). 
29 John Johnson, Gregory K. Leonard, Christine Meyer, & Ken Serwin, Don’t Feed the Trolls, 52 LES 
NOUVELLES 3, 487–95 (2007). 
30 See Anna Mayergoyz, Lessons from Europe on How to Tame U.S. Patent Trolls, 42 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 241 (2009) (noting that about 50% of all appealed patent litigation decisions are reversed). In the short 
term, defending a patent infringement suit can cause stock prices to drop. See Bessen, The Private and 
Social Costs of Patent Trolls, supra note 1, at 30 (estimating the median decline in common stock value of 
defendant corporations in patent infringement suits brought by NPEs at $20.4 million). 
31 Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991 (2007); 
John M. Golden, Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111 (2007). 
32 See Tina M. Nguyen, Lowering the Fare: Reducing the Patent Troll’s Ability to Tax the Patent 
System, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 101, 114 (2012). 
33 AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2011 I-153-56 (reporting 
median litigation costs for patent infringement lawsuits as follows: when less than $1 million was at risk, 
$350,000 and $650,000; when more than $1 million but less than $25 million was at risk, $1.5 million and 
$2.5 million; and when more than $25 million was at risk, $3 million and $5.5 million, through the 
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months just to proceed to the claim construction and discovery phases to reach summary 
judgment.34 These litigation realities afford any patent rights holder the opportunity to 
use threats of patent infringement as a “scare tactic to obtain unwarranted licenses and 
settlements”35—something akin to blackmail, extortion, and a Mafioso-style 
“shakedown.” 
¶17  This economic reality allows for a patent-trolling business model wherein PAEs 
use patents solely for rent seeking via nuisance lawsuits. PAEs search to acquire patents 
wholesale or in bankruptcy auctions, and often target commercial activity only 
superficially related to the subject matter of the patents. In addition, the cost of bringing a 
lawsuit is often minimal because a patent troll can make money by merely threatening 
potential defendants with cease-and-desist letters.36 This allows patent trolls to perform 
an efficient first-pass screen by “fishing” with identical letters to all the companies active 
in a particular product market, many of which will pay license fees without the PAE ever 
having to file a complaint.37 Additionally, these legal economies-of-scale continue to 
exist after the first-pass screen, as seen when a PAE files nearly identical complaints 
against successive defendants without any additional work. 
¶18  The patent-trolling problem creates economic deadweight loss, taxes technology 
users with transaction costs, and perhaps, impedes the spread and development of 
technology at large.38 Further, patent trolling unnecessarily harasses members of the 
business community. Moreover, when any entity asserts a frivolous patent infringement 
claim without a bona fide belief that the claim has legal merit, it hinders judicial 
economy, interferes with fair competition, distorts the purpose of patent litigation, and 
lowers public opinion of the legal system and profession.39 
B. Defining the Patent Troll 
¶19  A patent troll can loosely be defined as a bad-faith legal actor that seeks a payoff 
by threatening patent infringement lawsuits against product-manufacturing entities. A 
patent troll does not practice, or in many instances does not even have the means to 
 
discovery phases and final disposition respectively); see, e.g., Mayergoyz, supra note 30. 
34 Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and Potential Solutions: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of John G. Boswell, Senior Vice President & Gen. Counsel, SAS 
Inst.) (arguing that the high cost of discovery exacerbates the patent-troll problem, in one instance costing 
accused infringers up to $8 million just to get to the summary judgment stage). 
35 Nguyen, supra note 32; see Rep. Berman statement, supra note 18. 
36 Johnson, supra note 29, at 487 (discussing how extortionary royalty payments “constitute a ‘tax’ that 
ultimately leads to less product development and higher prices for consumers”). 
37 Jim Spencer, Patent Trolls Collect “Nuisance Fees” and Political Enemies, STAR TRIBUNE (June 15, 
2013), http://m.startribune.com/business/?id=211615651. Tim Scobie, Gen. Counsel of Mason Cos. of 
Chippewa Falls, Wis. stated, “[w]e are a small organization in a small town” and that “[i]f it’s going to cost 
us $25,000 for a license fee or it’s going to cost us $250,000 to fight, don’t even bother asking me.” Id. 
38 See Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7, at 400 (“[A] substantial part of the 
direct costs of NPE litigation is a deadweight loss to society.”); see also Rader Op-Ed., supra note 2 
(“[Patent Trolling] has slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses and 
consumers, and clogged our judicial system.”). 
39 The relative standards of “meritless” or “frivolous” as compared to “objectively unreasonable” or 
“low likelihood of success” is difficult to articulate. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–12, Octane Fitness, 
LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014) (No. 12-1184); see Bessen, The Direct Costs 
from NPE Disputes, supra note 7, at 389; Spencer, supra note 37. 
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practice, its patented technology. Then, if an alleged infringer rejects a cheap licensing 
fee, the patent troll indiscriminately sues the infringer, without investigating if grounds 
exist to claim infringement, in hopes of obtaining a settlement fee less than the cost of 
litigation. However, detailing the exact parameters of what constitutes a patent troll is 
problematic because the description above is both over- and under-inclusive. Moreover, 
the intent behind offers for license and/or settlement fees is often opaque. 
¶20  It is difficult for society to police something that it cannot define.40 Many suggest 
that there is no satisfactory definition of a patent troll.41 For instance, some consider 
patent-trolling behavior permissible, such as when universities develop proprietary 
technologies but do not commercialize the technologies themselves.42 Further, most 
definitions of a patent troll are over-inclusive because they often include other types of 
NPEs, such as individual inventors, inventive startup companies, failed businesses, and 
patent purchasers.43 After examining the patent troll, this Article argues for an approach 
that focuses on extortionary patent trolling instead of NPE status, and proposes what 
types of conduct are indicative of harmful patent trolling. 
¶21  This Article suggests that a “patent troll” is an entity that: 
(1) asserts a patent against a product-manufacturing company, while the patent is 
not being legally “practiced by anyone, i.e. neither licensed nor practiced by 
the owner,”44 and the owner has no intention of ever practicing;45 
(2) pursues a business model that aims to acquire overly broad patents to make 
profits by threatening lawsuits against anyone that makes products even 
remotely related to its patented technologies in order to get favorable license 
arrangements and/or settlements;46 and/or 
(3) does not plan to initially license or practice the patent it acquires, but rather 
hides and waits for potential infringers to come along, using the patent 
primarily to obtain high license fees while never practicing the patent.47 In 
 
40 See Tracie L. Bryant, The America Invents Act: Slaying Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 687, 690 (2012); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imaginary Creatures: A 
Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 166 (2007); John 
T. Funk, In Defense of the Trolls: Part 4 (Final), VIEW FROM THE BRIDGE (July 4, 2006, 9:10 PM), 
http://evergreenip.typepad.com/view_ from_bridge/2006/07/in_defense_of_t_1.html. 
41 John M. Golden, “Patent Trolls” and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2112 n.7 (2007) 
(noting the lack of a satisfactory definition for a patent troll). 
42 See Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 
611, 611 (2008) (arguing that universities should not be deemed trolls); see also Michael Risch, Patent 
Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 468 (2012) (“[U]niversities are very rarely patent plaintiffs.”). 
43 See Spencer, supra note 37 (quoting Rep. Paulsen) (“There is abuse that’s going on . . . the challenge 
is to target the abusers in an effective way without casting too wide a net.”); Nguyen, supra note 32, at 103. 
44 Eric J. Rogers, Ten Years of Inter Partes Patent Reexamination Appeals: An Empirical View, 29 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 305, 350 n.157 (2013). 
45 See Rader Address to AIPLC, supra note 16; Patent Trolls: Unfair Name-Calling, or Threat to 
Current Patent System?, 69 PAT. TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 565 (2005); see also David G. 
Barker, Troll or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with an Open Post-Grant Review, DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV., Apr. 2005, at 7. 
46 See Funk, supra note 40. 
47 Rep. Berman statement, supra note 18, at E1936; see Elizabeth D. Ferrill, Comment, Patent 
Investment Trusts: Let's Build a PIT to Catch the Patent Trolls, 6 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 367, 376 (2005); 
Mayergoyz, supra note 30. A parallel phenomenon is the trademark troll exemplified by Leo Stoller, who 
claimed rights to a large inventory of popular trademarks and attempted to assert those rights. However, 
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the alternative, a patent troll may acquire an overly broad patent after 
companies have already commercialized the technology and created a mature 
market rife with potential infringers, which it then uses primarily to obtain 
high settlements fees and/or damage awards.48 
¶22  This Article also suggests that the following types of conduct are indicative of 
“patent trolling”: 
(1) Reasserting the same patent against multiple entities to achieve advantageous 
economies-of-scale, whereas defending against patent infringement lawsuits 
is usually conducted one defendant at a time. 
(2) Not manufacturing or practicing any patents, which means the entity has no 
fear of having to (a) defend against a counterclaim, (b) consider cross-
licensing arrangements during license negotiations, (c) produce witnesses for 
depositions, or (d) expend additional legal costs beyond those associated with 
filing complaints and reusing documents and arguments made against 
previous defendants.49 
(3) Joining multiple defendants with different attributes and locales in the same 
patent infringement suit in an effort to promote efficiency and inhibit 
transfers of venue.50 
(4) Not making any products and thus having no customer base, which shields 
the patent troll from public relations problems related to litigation. 
(5) Retaining attorneys under contingency-fee agreements, which create nothing-
to-lose, low-risk scenarios for patent assertion.51 
¶23  The characteristics of a typical patent troll make them particularly difficult 
opponents in a lawsuit because they create asymmetries with patentees that 
commercialize their patented technologies. As noted in the second characteristic listed 
above, the typical patent troll does not fear a patent infringement counterclaim because it 
does not actively manufacture any products. Thus, the typical patent troll does not have 
any of its own products at risk from an injunction. These first two asymmetries prevent 
cross-licensing solutions and peace negotiations that are possible among competitors in 
most cases. As per the fifth characteristic listed above, the typical patent troll does not 
 
trademark law has a “use” requirement, which makes trademark trolling less feasible. See Mike Masnick, Is 
Famed Trademark Troll Leo Stoller Trying to Stealthily Reclaim Bogus Stealth Trademarks?, TECHDIRT 
(July 19, 2010, 9:37 AM), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100719/02130110270.shtml. 
48 Funk, supra note 40. 
49 See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011). An NPE has far 
fewer documents to produce, fewer witnesses, and a much smaller legal bill than a commercially active 
company that makes or sells products, or offers services. GAO Report, supra note 15, at 3. 
50 Patent trolls use the tactic of joining multiple but unrelated defendants in the same patent infringement 
suit to keep the trial in the venue of their choice, typically the Eastern District of Texas. See Bryant, supra 
note 40, at 688–89. The America Invents Act of 2011 tried to end this, but consolidation for pretrial 
purposes is still available. See, e.g., In re Bear Creek Techs., Inc., 858 F. Supp. 2d 1375, 1378 (J.P.M.L. 
2012). 
51 William R. Towns, U.S. Contingency Fees: A Level Playing Field?, WIPO MAGAZINE (Feb. 2010), 
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2010/01/article_0002.html (“Contingency fee arrangements are 
conducive to [patent trolling], as they allow [NPEs] to effectively spread the financial risk involved in 
patent litigation by partnering with their lawyers.”). 
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fear reputational harm or retribution from the public because it has no customers. And in 
reference to the last listed characteristic, patent trolling may be funded by contingency-
fee arrangements that create markets for patent litigators to find and bring the most 
financially promising lawsuits or settlements, regardless of the patented technologies’ 
value or the merits of the infringement claims. Thus, contingency-fee-based patent 
infringement representation is readily available for patent-trolling entities, whereas there 
is no counterpart patent-defense litigator market for defendants because accused 
infringers rarely receive large damage payouts and cannot use contingency-fee setups. 
These legal asymmetries are typical in patent-trolling cases. As a result, similar to 
“gamblers playing with house money—[patent trolls] can win, but cannot lose.”52 
C. Who Is Not a Patent Troll? 
¶24  Unlike the stereotypical patent troll—a commercially inactive shell company that 
purchases a patent as an investment for the sole purpose of threatening enforcement—
universities or inventors that do not practice their patents rarely deserve the patent-troll 
label. This is true despite the fact that these parties rarely produce goods and might 
threaten commercially active entities with accusations of patent infringement. 
¶25  The typical university exhibits many of the hallmark characteristics of a patent 
troll. However, while it does not make products of its own, a university can license 
without threats of litigation, and rarely relies on patent litigation for revenue.53 This 
makes economic sense because a rational, profit-maximizing monopolist who is unable to 
bring a technology to market independently should be free to license it to others who can. 
¶26  Besides universities, many startups and individuals can invent something so 
revolutionary that it threatens established companies and requires widespread litigation to 
protect. These startups or individual inventors may choose to grant licenses to more 
established companies for a modest return, or they may choose to exclude others, 
including established companies, while bringing the invention to market. In either 
scenario, the established companies would likely fight back by raising barriers to market 
entry, such that the most promising battleground for startups and lesser-funded entities 
might be in court.54 However, once in litigation, a startup or lesser-funded entity often 
finds itself up against a well-prepared litigation machine with a well-funded war chest. 
Thus, a research university, individual inventor, or startup company that develops and 
patents an invention intending to commercialize it in good faith should not be classified 
as a patent troll. 
¶27  For many NPEs—such as universities and individual inventors—to receive 
compensation for their patents, they need licensees or provable infringers that are 
commercially active. Individual inventors often lack access to capital and channels of 
manufacturing, marketing, and distribution. In response, these NPEs might benefit the 
most by selling their patent rights to patent trolls, resulting in an immediate reward for 
their inventive activities. Recent evidence suggests that some universities have begun to 
 
52 Peter Schechter, Guest Editorial: Throwing Trolls off the Bridge, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 10, 2013), 
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2013/03/guest-editorial-throwing-trolls-off-the-bridge.html. 
53 See Cotropia, supra note 7; Lemley, supra note 42; Risch, supra note 42. 
54 See Interview by Gene Quinn with Eric Gould Bear (Mar. 25, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/ 
2013/04/30/software-patents-drafting-for-litigation-and-a-global-economy/id=39570/ (“[T]op technology 
innovators simply won’t listen to licensing overtures unless they are first sued.”). 
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exercise this option,55 despite the fact that many openly consider this contrary to the 
public interest.56 If the number of patent trolls were largely reduced, instead of having the 
option to sell patents to parties that exploit the legal system, NPEs like universities and 
individual inventors would be forced to rely upon non-exploitive alternatives that value 
patents based on real-world technology. 
¶28  Another problem is that some commercially active companies that invest heavily in 
research and development might “find it profit-maximizing not to vertically integrate 
their R&D and manufacturing processes, choosing instead to set up patent-holding 
companies that focus on development, acquisition, maintenance and licensing of 
intellectual property.”57 In addition, universities often assign their patents to related 
entities for separate management.58 These patent-holding companies appear to be NPE 
patent trolls despite their close relationship to the original inventive entity.59 Finally, 
some transaction-only firms aggregate patents solely for collaborative cross-
licensing/licensing-alliance purposes or for setting industry standards.60 
D. Focusing on the Claimant’s Intent Rather than Status 
¶29  The hallmarks of a patent troll are that it makes no products of its own, licenses 
patent rights only after threatening litigation, and primarily uses threats of patent 
litigation to generate revenue from licensing and settlements because potential defendants 
fear costly litigation and the possibility of injunctions.61 However, which indicators, if 
any, are most telling of the patent-trolling behavior that so many wish to prevent? For 
instance, certain characteristics could indicate deleterious patent trolling, such as an 
entity’s lack of manufacturing capability or its licensing activity prior to litigation. But as 
discussed previously, this approach is both under- and over-inclusive. Thus, this Article 
posits that an entity’s litigious conduct, such as whether it makes indiscriminate threats or 
offers strategic settlements, provides the best guidance. In other words, the intent behind 
 
55 See Heidi Ledford, Universities Struggle to Make Patents Pay, 501 NATURE 471, 471–2 (Sept. 2013), 
available at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.13811!/menu/main/topColumns/topLeftColumn/ 
pdf/501471a.pdf; see also Ashby Jones, When Lawyers Become Trolls, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052970203750404577173402442681284; Ewing, supra 
note 21. 
56 See Memorandum from the Cal. Inst. of Tech. et al., In the Public Interest: Nine Points to Consider in 
Licensing University Technology 8 (Mar. 6, 2007), available at http://otl.stanford.edu/documents/ 
whitepaper-10.pdf (“[U]niversities would better serve the public interest by ensuring appropriate use of 
their technology by requiring their licenses to operate under a business model that encourages 
commercialization and does not rely primarily on threats of infringement litigation to generate revenue.”). 
While originally drafted by eleven organizations, over ninety institutions of higher education have voiced 
support for this document since 2007.  See Ron Katz, Isaac Vaughn, & Mike Gilleran, Nine Points to 
Consider Regarding the Payment of College Athletes, INST. OF SPORTS L. & ETHICS (2013). 
57 Johnson, supra note 29, at 488. 
58 See, e.g., Quick Facts, WIS. ALUMNI RESEARCH FOUND. (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.warf.org/home/ 
about-us/background/quick-facts/quick-facts.cmsx. 
59 Johnson, supra note 29, at 488. 
60 For example, the patent aggregator RPX Corp. claims it acquires patents for defensive purposes only, 
licenses every patent it owns to all of its clients, and promises never to assert any of its patents. RPX, 
www.rpxcorp.com (last visited Sept. 12, 2014).  
61 See Todd Klein, Comment, eBay v. MercExchange and KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.: The Supreme 
Court Wages War Against Patent Trolls, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 295, 296, 300–02 (2007); M. Qaiser & P. 
Mohan Chandran, Patent Terrorism: Terror of the Intangibles, IP FRONTLINE (June 27, 2006), http:// 
www.ipfrontline.com/depts/article.asp?id=11605&deptid=3; see also Ferrill, supra note 47, at 377. 
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the entity’s actions should direct patent-trolling analysis, rather than its commercial 
characteristics or NPE status. 
¶30  An entity that lacks good-faith intent at the time of patent acquisition is more likely 
to be a patent troll. Entities evince this lack of good faith if they never plan to 
commercialize or otherwise practice a patent. Some NPEs might obtain a patent with the 
goal of eventually commercializing the invention, whereas the true patent troll “never has 
the intention of bringing the invention to market.”62 Further, patent trolls often acquire 
relatively inexpensive patents from bankrupt companies or independent inventors.63 As 
such, with some difference in degree, patent trolls generally inhibit or tax the 
commercialization of technologies, which does not benefit the public. But it is important 
to note that the grant of a patent creates only the legal right to exclude others from 
practicing the patent—not the obligation to practice the patent or license patent rights to 
others.64 
¶31  Creating further complexities, a competitive business environment can incent 
companies to switch from a business model focused on technological development to one 
motivated by generating legal revenue through patent trolling. Thus, an originally 
innovative and commercially active company may also manifest the problematic conduct 
identified above.65 Moreover, markets now exist that allow for outside investment in 
patent rights, which monetizes patents solely via patent assertion. This further promotes 
patent trolling because investor returns stem either directly from a PAE’s exploitative 
conduct or indirectly by the sale of patents to other PAEs intending to do the same.66 
¶32  Even patent-practicing entities can exhibit behavior indicative of patent trolling 
when it relates to patents “well outside the area in which they make products.”67 For 
example, if a commercially active cellphone company acquires patent rights in an 
unrelated industry (e.g., the medical-device industry), and then threatens active 
companies in this other industry with cease-and-desist letters demanding license fees, 
many would characterize this as patent trolling, despite the lack of NPE status. In fact, 
cash-rich technology companies that never intend to commercialize the claimed 
 
62 Nguyen, supra note 32, at 105; see Rep. Berman statement, supra note 18. 
63 See Bryant, supra note 40, at 691. When bankruptcy courts approve the transfer of patent rights, the 
transfer is without any encumbrances. See, e.g., In re PBBPC, Inc., 484 B.R. 860 (1st Cir. B.A.P. 2013).  
64 See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405 (1908) (holding that it was the 
essence of the patent to exclude others without question of motive and thus establishing the principle that 
patent holders have no obligation to use their patent). This principle, which is more than a century old, has 
not changed. See Alexander Poltorak, Letter to the Editor, Inventors, Trolls, Patents and Improving the 
System, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732457790 
4578559632006573250. In fact, there are many reasons why patent owners may not practice their patents, 
including government regulations, blocking patents, and antitrust implications. See generally JANICE M. 
MUELLER, INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW (2d ed. 2006); 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET AL., PAT. L. 
FUNDAMENTALS § 1:12 (2d ed. 2014) (“A dominant patent is in some contexts referred to as a blocking 
patent, because its holder can prevent others, including those who hold subservient patents, from practicing 
their inventions.”). 
65 See Richard S. Hill, Don’t Turn My Company into a Patent Troll!, FORBES (May 13, 2013),  
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2013/05/13/dont-turn-my-company-into-a-patent-troll/. 
66 J. Jason Williams et al., Strategies for Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 372 
(2010). For example, Round Rock Research is an NPE that obtained 4,200 patents with help from venture-
capital fund, Gemas Capital Inc. See Jones, supra note 55. 
67 Bessen, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, supra note 7, at 395; RPX CORP. REPORT, supra note 1, 
at 7 (defining noncompeting entities as “operating companies asserting patents outside their areas of 
products of services”); see Jones, supra note 55. 
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technologies are often the most active patent acquirers.68 Eventually, a company may 
choose to monetize a portfolio of unused patents for patent trolling or sell the patents to 
others for patent trolling.69 
¶33  Furthermore, a new practice called “patent privateering” has surfaced with the 
potential of becoming yet another form of patent trolling.70 This practice involves 
specialized patent-litigation firms, such as patent aggregators, which are assigned a patent 
just for litigation and/or technology transfer purposes.71 Patent privateering can help 
those who develop inventions recover remuneration from a proportion of the damages 
received from infringers. In addition to outsourcing litigation, some companies create 
their own patent holding companies for the sole purpose of enforcing and licensing 
patents.72 Both of these approaches shield the sponsoring company from bad public 
relations, antitrust lawsuits, and tortious interference with other companies.73 
E. The Positive Effects of Patent Trolls and Patent Trolling 
¶34  Some view patent trolling as a legitimate means of extracting value from a patent.74 
The fact that a patent infringement claimant is not practicing the invention does not 
disturb the basic setup of the patent system, which trades exclusive rights for a limited 
time in exchange for disclosure.75 Practicing the patented technology is not required as 
part of the bargain—it is only the disclosure that is required by law.76 In fact, a patent 
grant from the government does not automatically confer the patentee with the legal right 
 
68 See Joff Wild, The Entities that Own the 100 Biggest US Patent Portfolios Own Over 30% of All 
Active US Patents, IAM MAGAZINE BLOG (Feb. 4, 2013), http://www.iam-magazine.com/blog/Detail. 
aspx?g=840f9fef-ef84-4e4f-951d-b163251dd47d (reporting that while 140,000 entities own at least one 
active U.S. patent, the top 100 entities own well over 30% of all currently active U.S. patents). 
69 See Peg Brickley, Nortel Gets Court Nod for Auction of Patents, WALL ST. J. (May 2, 2011), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052748704436004576299571398866698. 
70 See Tom Ewing, Indirect Exploitation of Intellectual Property Rights by Corporations and Investors: 
IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Marque & Reprisal, 4 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 5 (2012); see also 
Johnson, supra note 29. 
71 See Klein, supra note 61, at 298–99. In 2004, Asure Software, known then as Forgent Networks, sued 
forty companies worldwide for patent infringement and expects to receive more than $1 billion in licensing 
fees as a result. Id. 
72 Spine Solutions v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek USA, 620 F.3d 1305, 1317–18 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(holding that the parent and sister companies of the plaintiff lacked standing for the patent infringement 
claim because neither were exclusive licensees). 
73 However, some proposed bills in Congress would allow fee shifting for non-prevailing parties to 
reach the controlling entities of shell companies. See, e.g., H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013). 
74 See James F. McDonough III, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of 
Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 190 (2006); see also Funk, supra note 40; 
Merges, supra note 22, at 1597. See generally Joel Benjamin, The Other Side of the Debate over Patent 
Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/12/10/the-other-side-of-the-
debate-over-patent-trolls/id=46671/. 
75 An un-commercialized patent is like a blueprint for a technology that no one can use; however, 
society would rather have more blueprints for “bridges” than no bridges at all, which according to the 
disclosure theory of the patent system, increases the storehouse of knowledge. But see Steven J. Moore, A 
Fractured Fairy Tale: Separating Fact & Fiction on Patent Trolls, IPWATCHDOG (July 29, 2013), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/29/a-fractured-fairy-tale-separating-fact-fiction-on-patent-
trolls/id=43697/ (positing the analogy that as mythical trolls are to travel, patent trolls are to innovation, in 
that both lockup the resources found on the other side of their respective bridges). 
76 See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 
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to use or sell the patented invention. For example, the existence of a blocking patent 
might prevent a patentee from ever practicing its own patent.77 
¶35  The legal right to exclude others created by a patent grant is freely alienable.78 
Neither the identity of the patent holder nor the means by which the patent was acquired 
is generally relevant to the legality of enforcing the right—it is the conduct and intent in 
bringing the litigation that matters when characterizing patent-trolling behavior. Certain 
NPEs referred to as “patent monetizing entities” (PMEs) or “patent licensing entities” 
(PLEs) might acquire patents as investments to generate revenue primarily from licensing 
and resale, but not from litigation.79 In fact, this conduct provides incentives to invent and 
promotes innovation by increasing the liquidity of patent markets. 
¶36  And not all patent trolling causes deadweight economic loss.80 Some NPEs, even if 
lacking good-faith intent when acquiring patents, might still provide the same benefits to 
society by promoting innovation and patent liquidity. For instance, patent trolls can 
obtain patents from small inventive companies and individual inventors, which helps 
recoup losses for failed startups and reduces risk for inventors.81 This in turn provides 
economic incentives for investing in startup technology companies because even if the 
company fails, its investors own a patent portfolio that might retain some value.82 In 
addition, some large companies might feel free to infringe individual inventors’ and small 
businesses’ patents because the patent owner likely cannot afford the legal costs of 
fighting in court. Transferring their patents to a patent troll might be an economically 
sound decision that rewards them for their inventive contribution to society. Thus, even 
bad-faith PAEs can provide the benefits of innovation incentives and patent liquidity to 
small businesses and individual inventors. 
¶37  Further, contingency-funded patent assertion might enfranchise a greater 
population of patent rights for potential litigation and thus reduce costs for patentees, 
especially for small-entity patent holders. That being said, the often-coercive financial 
burden placed on defendants likely outweighs the equitable benefits of this legal 
phenomenon. 
¶38  Thus, some NPE lawsuits promote invention; increase investment in research and 
development; offset financial risk for startup companies and their investors; and 
compensate actual inventors who cannot enforce patents. However, from 2000–2007, 
NPEs filed more than 80% of repeat patent lawsuits and owned more than 50% of the 
most litigated patents, which clearly suggests an imbalance.83 
 
77 Id. 
78 Waterman v. Mackenzie, 137 U.S. 252, 255–56 (1891). 
79 See Rembrandt Techs., LP v. Harris Corp., C.A. No. 07C-09-059-JRS, 2009 WL 402332 (Del. Super. 
Ct. Feb. 12, 2009) (“Alternatively, if the patents could not be acquired, the partnership would form a joint 
venture or limited partnership with the patent owner and/or financing partners, frequently resulting in the 
creation of a patent licensing entity.”). 
80 See Chien, supra note 3, at 479–82. 
81 See McDonough, supra note 74, at 208–9. 
82 See Steve Seidenberg, Troll Control, 92 A.B.A. J. 51 (2006). 
83 John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley, & Joshua H. Walker, Extreme Value or Trolls on Top? The 
Characteristics of the Most Litigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 24 (2009). 
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F. Weak, Borderline, and Dubious Patent Infringement Claims are the Real Culprits 
¶39  Professors Jay Kesan and David Schwartz argue that the focus should be on the 
merits of the patent infringement lawsuit instead of on the characteristics or conduct of 
the patent infringement claimant.84 This approach gets to the heart of the problem—a 
nuisance lawsuit is by definition a complaint without a sound legal basis that is just 
strong enough to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.85 One study reported that the 
troll-variety of NPE rarely wins judgments against wealthy defendants.86 A different 
study reported that patent trolls win on the merits less than 10% of the time, while 
another found the rate to be slightly higher at 25%.87 These numbers support the common 
perception that patent infringement claims brought by NPEs tend to be weak, arbitrary, 
and/or legally dubious. Simply stated, weak or meritless patent infringement threats are 
the gist of the patent-trolling problem because a legitimate claim would not constitute a 
nuisance lawsuit. “[T]rolls . . . make money by threatening companies with expensive 
lawsuits and then using that cudgel, rather than the merits of a case, to extract a financial 
settlement” before the lack of merit in the case is exposed.88 
¶40  In conclusion, although a patent troll is difficult to define, the assertion of credible 
patent claims versus nuisance claims can be policed. Instead of identifying the patent troll 
by its status to declare the entire lawsuit a nuisance,89 courts should first isolate the 
nuisance patent infringement claim and then declare the patent infringement claimant’s 
behavior as patent trolling. Similar to Justice Stewart’s opinion on pornography that—“I 
know it when I see it”90—while one might not be able to define what constitutes a patent 
troll, one can recognize certain nuisance patent infringement claims. Thus, courts should 
be able to identify and handle discernible nuisance patent infringement claims regardless 
 
84 See Cotropia, supra note 7; GAO Report, supra note 15, at 45. 
85 Johnson, supra note 29, at 477–88. 
86 Bryant, supra note 40, at 693. 
87 Michael J. Mazzeo, Jonathan H. Ashtor, & Samantha Zyontz, Do NPEs Matter? Non-Practicing 
Entities and Patent Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. OF COMPETITION L. & ECON. 879 (forthcoming 2014) 
(reporting lower patent litigation win rates for NPEs as compared to practicing entities); Risch, supra note 
42, at 481 (reporting that NPE’s lose patent infringement suits more often than practicing entities, and 
further suggesting that this is caused by NPEs asserting weaker patents on average); see Allison et al., 
supra note 15; see also Abusive Patent Litigation: The Impact on American Innovation and Jobs, and 
Potential Solutions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. 
Comm. of the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 10 (2013) (statement of Mark Chandler, Senior Vice President & 
Gen. Counsel, Cisco Sys., Inc.) (“PAEs ultimately lose 92 percent of the time . . . versus 60 percent for 
other plaintiffs.”). But see Jonathan H. Ashtor, Michael J. Mazzeo, Samantha Zyontz, Patents At Issue: The 
Data Behind the Patent Troll Debate, Address at the Commercial Function of Patents in Today’s Innovation 
Economy Conference (Mar. 4, 2011), available at http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/faculty/mazzeo/ 
htm/patents_at_issue.pdf (finding from 1995–2011 “approximately equal success rates for PAEs as for 
other patent claimants”); Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing, & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects 
of Patent Monetization Entities, UC HASTINGS RESEARCH PAPER No. 45 (Apr. 9, 2013) (showing that 
because settlements are so common, the statistical differences in win rates between NPEs and non-NPEs 
are not clear); Steven J. Moore, Probing 10 Patent Troll Myths: A Fractured Fairy Tale, IPWATCHDOG 
(July 30, 2013), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/07/30/probing-10-patent-troll-myths-a-factured-
fairytale-part-2/ (“[W]e saw little difference between the outcome profile of Producers and the NPEs.”). 
88 Rader Op-Ed., supra note 2. 
89 It is important to note that not every case brought by a patent troll lacks merit. Also, not every NPE 
that asserts a patent claim is automatically patent trolling despite readily raised accusations of such by 
defendants. See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
90 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). 
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of the characteristics, conduct, and strategies of various patent infringement claimants, 
which may evolve over time. 
II. PROPOSED CHANGES TO INHIBIT PATENT TROLLING 
¶41  Many have proposed solutions to combat the rise of patent trolling, which typically 
focus on thwarting NPEs’ exploitation of inefficiencies in the patent litigation system. 
These reforms include legislation, judicial opinions, and private-party tactics. Part II 
addresses these proposals in kind. 
¶42  Congress has proposed at least seven bills for this purpose over the past two years, 
such as the SHIELD Act and Innovation Act discussed below.91 Given the bipartisan 
nature of these bills, the intensity of lobbying by the business community, and the Obama 
administration’s interest, the likelihood of legislative reform continues to increase.92 
A.  The Federal Response 
¶43  The federal response to the rise of patent trolling has involved proposed legislation 
and agency actions. The Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes 
Act (SHIELD Act) would create a limited, loser-pays system that shifts litigation costs to 
 
91 See, e.g., Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013, H.R. 845, 113th 
Cong. (2013) (proposing cost shifting for prevailing defendants’ legal fees and costs to infringement 
claimants as a “loser-pays system,” which is similar to the default English rule, except the proposal does 
not apply when the claimant is an original inventor, substantial investor, university, or technology-transfer 
organization); Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (suggesting a variety of reforms including 
fee shifting based on the outcome of the case, having the requesting party pay the cost of discovery, and 
delaying discovery until after claim construction); End Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. 
(2013) (targeting the use of shell companies to disguise the “real party-in-interest”); Patent Litigation and 
Innovation Act, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing changes to the rules for pleadings, joinder, and 
discovery in patent litigation, as well as delaying discovery until preliminary motions are resolved); Patent 
Abuse Reduction Act, S. 1013, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing shifting the major costs of discovery to the 
requesting party); Patent Quality Improvement Act, S. 866, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing an expanded 
scope for post-grant challenges to business method patents under the Covered Business Method Review 
Program); Stopping Offensive Use of Patents Act, H.R. 2766, 113th Cong. (2013) (proposing a similar 
expansion of post-grant challenges to business method patents under the Covered Business Method Review 
Program); Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. (2013) (deterring abusive patent litigation 
involving frivolous lawsuits); Patent Transparency and Improvements Act, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013) 
(promoting transparency in patent ownership among other things); Transparency in Assertion of Patents 
Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2013) (attempting to reduce unfair and deceptive practices in the assertion of 
patents). 
92 Andrew Ramonas, Patent Troll Bills Moving up in Senate and House, CORP. COUNSEL (Nov. 19, 
2013), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202628689137/Patent-Troll-Bills-Moving-Up-in-Senate-and-
House?slreturn=20140315005345; Letter from Alliance of Automobile Mfrs. et al., to Rep. John Boehner, 
Speaker, H. of Reps., et al. (July 17, 2013), available at http://www.patentprogress.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2013/07/BigTent-Patent-Letter.pdf (“There is a growing consensus that now is the time to address 
this issue.”). Other solutions should be proposed, such as clawback or bounty systems, which refund past 
patent-litigation settlement payers if a patent troll loses to a subsequent defendant in litigation regarding the 
same patent claims and substantially similar allegedly infringing conduct. This approach would remedy 
unjust enrichment of patent trolls for all or part of settlement and/or license fees gained at the cost of 
previous defendants by disgorging past, ill-gotten gains and returning them to the deserving parties. See 
generally Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 763 
(2002); John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent 
Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001); Joseph S. Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation Stage 
Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667 (2004). 
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the non-prevailing party in patent infringement lawsuits.93 This bill aims to dissuade 
PAEs from bringing meritless patent infringement lawsuits by imposing more financial 
risk, and attempts to encourage accused infringers to defend the case instead of giving in 
to empty threats. This loser-pays system would be limited in that inventors, original 
assignees, universities, and practicing entities would not be subject to this cost shifting; 
these NPEs could bring a patent infringement lawsuit without fear of paying the other 
side’s costs, regardless of outcome. 
¶44  Similarly, other legislation proposes that courts award reasonable fees to the 
prevailing party “unless the court finds that the position and conduct of the nonprevailing 
party or parties were substantially justified or that special circumstances make an award 
unjust.”94 Before asserting a patent infringement claim, the claimant would have to post 
bond to cover litigation costs if the PAE loses.95 Although posting a bond for litigation 
costs might unfairly burden certain claimants, such as an individual inventor who wishes 
to pursue a meritorious claim against a well-funded defendant, this cost shifting would 
normally be justified. 
¶45  This legislation alters the default American Rule, which normally requires that each 
party pay its own costs. The American Rule unfortunately creates an environment where 
businesses have little to gain but much to lose if they choose to fight a patent troll. A 
common justification for the American Rule is that it provides everyone an opportunity to 
be heard by a court without worrying about financial calamity in case of an unfortunate 
or unexpected verdict.96 However, the American Rule has long been criticized because 
defendants may be forced into court without much assurance that their legal expenses 
will be reimbursed, even if the accusation is without merit and entirely frivolous.97 The 
proposed legislation intends to remedy the downside of the American Rule in the patent 
litigation context. Yet variants of the SHIELD Act have repeatedly failed to pass 
Congress. 
¶46  On December 5, 2013, the House of Representatives passed the Innovation Act 
with a large bipartisan majority. This bill includes a modified loser-pays system that 
provides for fee shifting from the prevailing party to the non-prevailing if the position 
and conduct of the non-prevailing party was not reasonably justified in law and fact.98 
However, unlike a closely related Senate bill requiring the asserting entity to post bond to 
cover the shifted litigation costs,99 the Innovation Act does not have a bond requirement, 
but holds interested parties financially responsible if the party to the litigation is unable to 
pay the shifted fees.100 One of the key characteristics of the Innovation Act is that it 
mandates the disclosure of the “real party-in-interest,” including assignees, licensees, and 
 
93 It is limited in the sense that it shifts the cost only one way, from claimants to accused infringers. 
94 S. 1612, 113th Cong. § 285 (2013). 
95 Id. 
96 See John F. Vargo, American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person’s Access to 
Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1594 (1992). 
97 See id. at 1592; John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 
47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1984). 
98 H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (explaining that courts may find an exemptible circumstance, such as 
undue hardship, for an individual inventor patent infringement claimant). 
99 Patent Litigation Integrity Act, S. 1612, 113th Cong. § 285 (2013). 
100 H.R. 3309. 
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other entities.101 In addition, the Innovation Act introduces heightened pleading 
requirements for patent infringement lawsuits that require the claimant to identify the 
specific element of the accused instrumentality on which the patent claim reads. In other 
words, the Innovation Act would render blanket demand letters lacking specific details 
legally inadequate to put the receiver on notice of patent infringement, which starts the 
accrual of damages.102 Importantly, the Innovation Act would limit discovery in the early 
stages of patent litigation to only things related to claim construction until the Markman 
hearing is completed.103 Although the Innovation Act has some components that would 
help inhibit abusive behavior related to patent litigation, it is likely to wither in the Senate 
like its predecessors. 
¶47  The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) recently announced tighter regulations of 
patent trolls. The FTC planned to begin an investigation focused on a few selected 
companies to determine if they are stockpiling patents for the sole purpose of suing others 
for patent infringement.104 The investigation would include using the FTC’s subpoena 
power to pierce the veil of secrecy that some patent trolls hide behind using shell 
companies.105 This investigation might also consider the anticompetitive behavior of 
certain patent trolls, and could suggest an antitrust investigation by the Antitrust 
Division.106 However, these investigations concern criminal collusion in violation of 
federal fair competition laws, and thus will unlikely have an impact on nuisance lawsuits 
brought by patent trolls. 
¶48  In 2013, the Obama administration went on the offensive against patent trolls, 
recommending certain legislative action. President Obama announced that he would take 
major steps to address the problem of patent trolls.107 In relevant parts, the announcement 
recommended legislation that includes 1) requiring patentees and applicants to disclose 
the “real party-in-interest,” an action aimed to publically expose the identities of patent 
trolls who frivolously demand a quick and cheap licensing agreement, 2) permitting more 
discretion in awarding fees to prevailing parties in patent cases, and 3) expanding the 
USPTO’s transitional program designed to provide an affordable alternative to patent 
litigations, among other things.108 Further, three executive actions were proposed: 1) 
adopting a rule requiring patent applicants and owners to regularly update ownership 
information with the USPTO in the hopes that registration records would reveal the real 
party-in-interest, 2) training patent examiners to more highly scrutinize functional claims, 
 
101 Id. The Act defines financial interest as “(i) with regard to a patent or patents, the right of a person to 
receive proceeds related to the assertion of the patent or patents, including a fixed or variable portion of 
such proceeds; and (ii) with regard to the plaintiff, direct or indirect ownership or control by a person of 
more than 5 percent of such plaintiff.” Id. § 4. 
102 See 35 U.S.C. § 287 (2003). 
103 H.R. 3309, § 299A. 
104 See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Seeks to Examine Patent Assertion Entities and Their 




107 Press Release, Exec. Office of the President, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech 
Patent Issues (June 4, 2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/fact-
sheet-white-house-task-force-high-tech-patent-issues. 
108 Id. 
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which have been heavily exploited by patent trolls, and 3) expanding dedicated outreach 
studies with regard to patent policies and laws.109    
B. Deficiencies in the Various Federal Proposals 
¶49  While many of the proposed laws could have a major impact on patent litigation, 
none would sufficiently deter the majority of patent trolling. First, executive action would 
unlikely have significant impact, even if Congress implements all the recommendations 
as planned. The recommendation for cost-shifting legislation only adds support for the 
passage of the SHIELD Act, and the recommendation to expand the study of patent 
policies ensures only more questions, not solutions. Second, the implementation of the 
SHIELD Act might discourage a patent-rights holder with limited financial resources 
from bringing a meritorious patent action against zealous or previously successful 
defendant infringers. As a result, this legislative approach might have the unintended 
consequence of creating something similar to the core problem stemming from the 
English Rule (non-prevailing parties always pay opposing parties’ legal fees), which 
denies an opportunity for some legitimate patent infringement claimants from ever 
having their day in court.110 
¶50  Less significant proposals include expanding the covered-business-method review 
program, providing better training for patent examiners, imposing heightened pleading 
standards for claims of patent infringement, and revealing the “real party-in-interest.” 
First, training patent examiners to issue less vague and abstract patent claims and making 
patent review under the USPTO’s transitional program available to more patents would 
reduce the arsenal of patent claims available for patent trolling prospectively. It would 
not, however, directly and immediately thwart patent trolling. Second, revealing the “real 
party-in-interest” is unlikely to significantly deter patent trolling, but would assist the 
receivers of cease-and-desist letters in gathering information about a common accuser, 
which thus helps private parties better prepare for and defend against frivolous patent 
infringement allegations.111 Lastly, the stricter pleading standards proposed by the Patent 




110 See Letter from Louis J. Foreman, CEO, Enventys & Edison Nation, et al., to Sen. Patrick J. Leahy, 
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, et al. 6 (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://democrats.judiciary.house. 
gov/sites/democrats.judiciary.house.gov/files/documents/InventGrp131119.pdf (“[The U.S.] rejected the 
British system in large part to allow all citizens access to courts, in which disputes would be resolved on 
the merits. Over the years, when Congress has granted exceptions to the American Rule, it has generally 
been for the purpose of encouraging litigation by creating ‘private attorneys general’ to conduct litigation to 
enforce public policies that might otherwise be too risky to pursue.”). Congress granted exceptions to the 
American Rule when passing the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts of the mid-1960s, the Equal Access 
to Justice Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and the Freedom of Information 
Act. Id. 
111 See infra Part II.D. 
112 See, e.g., Connectel, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 526, 528 (E.D. Tex. 2005) (applying 
Local Patent Rules for the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas); D.C.COLO.LPtR 1–17 
(outlining proposed local patent rules for the U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado); see also 
Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 46 ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015). However, 
the Eastern District of Texas has not experienced a decrease in patent troll litigation. RPX CORP. REPORT, 
supra note 1, at 4; 2012 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY, supra note 1. 
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¶51  In summary, encouraging businesses to stand up to patent trolls reduces the amount 
of frivolous claims that result in settlement and license fees. This makes patent trolling 
less profitable and reduces the patent arsenal available for patent trolls to exploit the 
patent system. Ultimately, this has the collective effect of reducing patent trolling by an 
amount equated to the increased risk of pursuing a claim resulting in financial loss, which 
leaves the patent-trolling problem for the market to decide after only a slight modification 
to the cost/risk asymmetries discussed supra Part I.B. However, small businesses cannot 
afford costly litigation, and even well-funded businesses are unlikely to willingly engage 
in litigation unless the licensing deal offered by patent trolls costs more than litigation. 
And as discussed previously, patent trolls will make every calculation before offering a 
deal in order to avoid asking for too much. Thus, market participants will likely continue 
to pay off patent trolls to make these nuisance lawsuits go away, albeit at a lower price 
than at present. By marginally readjusting the economic asymmetries against the patent 
troll, these proposals serve, at best, as only a partial fix for the fundamental problem of 
patent-trolling exploitation of litigation inefficiencies. Notably, the preceding fee-shifting 
proposals penalize not only the patent trolls, but also other non-prevailing NPEs. 
C. One State at the Vanguard in Fighting Patent Trolling 
¶52  The states, as well as the courts, have acknowledged the patent trolls’ exploitation 
of the patent system. Lawmakers backed by entrepreneurial funding have tried to address 
the patent-trolling problem at the state level.113 Their efforts focus on creating a hostile 
environment for those acting in bad faith and exploiting the system. States have taken 
steps to hinder patent-trolling entities by making it more likely that claimants, when 
shown to be acting in bad faith, reimburse unfairly accused infringers for litigation costs. 
¶53  The first state action occurred in 2013 when the State of Vermont filed a lawsuit 
against MPHJ Technology Investment, LLC, an entity alleged to have a track record of 
harassing Vermont businesses.114 Meanwhile, taking effect on July 1, 2013, a law titled 
“Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement,” was enacted.115 
¶54  The Vermont law allows targets of patent trolling to bring retaliatory actions (in 
state and federal district courts) to obtain compensatory and exemplary damages, plus 
costs and fees.116 The Vermont law created a factor-based test to determine when acts 
constitute bad-faith patent assertions.117 The test identifies non-exhaustive factors that 
might indicate bad faith by the PAE, such as sending demand-letters that lack basic 
information about the infringement claim or that seek payment of unreasonable royalty 
fees.118 In contrast, factors that suggest good-faith patent assertion by an NPE include 
whether the PAE is the original inventor or an educational institution.119 
¶55  Over a dozen states have followed Vermont’s lead and enacted similar laws, and 
about a dozen more states are considering doing the same.120 However, state actions face 
 
113 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195–99 (2013). 
114 See Complaint, Vermont v. MPHJ Tech. Inv., LLC, No. 282-5-13Wncv (Vt. Sup. Ct. 2012). 





120 Anti-patent-troll laws exist in these states:  Alabama (S.B. 121, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Georgia (Act 513, 
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multiple limitations in restricting the activities of patent trolls. The long-term effects of 
these state actions are hard to predict, especially because this approach is subject to 
judicial review. Ultimately, a federal court will have to decide whether a state law 
restricting patent rights is, or is not, preempted by federal law.121 
¶56  Many criticize individual state laws for being non-uniform and suppressing the 
rights of patent holders. First, differing state laws might force multistate companies to 
employ state-specific defensive strategies against patent trolls, which is both inefficient 
and potentially costly. Further, patent trolls are better equipped to formulate new 
manipulative strategies to overcome state action. Thus, this lack of uniformity might in 
fact exacerbate current legal asymmetries in the patent litigation system. Second, as 
mentioned above, state legislation might impermissibly restrict the federal rights of 
patent-rights holders, thereby rendering the laws preempted. In the end, the best solution 
requires a uniform approach in order to both level the legal playing field and not 
discourage legitimate patent infringement lawsuits brought in good faith. 
D. Private-Party Tactics 
¶57  One counter to the patent-trolling problem is the creation of a public registry of 
demand letters.122 This enables small players to better understand why they might have 
been targeted by a cease-and-desist letter or license offer. Further, it allows future targets 
of patent trolling to take preventative measures by exposing certain entities using shotgun 
tactics and their corresponding, previously asserted patents. An example is the Electronic 
Frontier Foundation’s Trolling Effects, which allows users to share and get information 
on demand letters.123 
¶58  Another solution is one where potential defendants can cooperatively form 
litigation cost-sharing arrangements to lower legal expenses, such as through joint-
defense and representation groups. These arrangements enable the sharing of work 
product and privileged information without having to waive attorney–client privilege and 
work–product immunity. However, these contractual agreements often obligate members 
to litigate to the judgment stage, which is often prohibitively expensive, even when 
parties share the financial burden.124 
¶59  In conclusion, although these state and federal actions have merit, none focuses on 
the inherent wrongfulness of the patent troll’s exploitative conduct. Rather, state and 
 
Reg. Sess. (2014)), Idaho (S.B. 1354, 62d Leg. (2014)), Illinois (S.B. 3405, 98th Gen. Assemb. (2014)), 
Louisiana (S.B. 255, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Maine (S.P. 654, 126th Leg., Reg. Sess. (2014)), Maryland (S.B. 
585, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Missouri (H.B. 1374, Reg. Sess. (2014)), New Hampshire (S.B. 303, Reg. Sess. 
(2014)), Oklahoma (H.B. 2837, 54th Leg., 2d Sess. (2014)), Oregon (S.B. 1540, Reg. Sess. (2014)), South 
Dakota (S.B. 143, Reg. Sess. (2014)), Tennessee (H.B. 2117, 108th Reg. Sess. (2014)), Utah (H.B. 117, 
Gen. Sess. (2014)), Virginia (H.B. 375, Reg. Sess. (2014)), and Wisconsin (Act 339, Reg. Sess. (2013)). 
Other states are currently considering similar legislation—Connecticut, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Carolina. See Tony 
Dutra, Nine States Now Have Enacted Legislation Targeting Patent Troll Demand Letter Abuse, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (May 7, 2014), http://www.bna.com/nine-states-enacted-n17179890261/. The Virginia 
law (H.B. 375) is unique in that it lays out indicia of bad faith or lack thereof for letters containing 
accusations of patent infringement, such as cease-and-desist letters and demands for licenses. 
121 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225 (2000). 
122 See, e.g., TROLLING EFFECTS, https://trollingeffects.org/letters (last visited Dec. 31, 2013). 
123 See id. 
124 See Dura Global Techs., Inc. v. Magna Donnelly Corp., 662 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Mich. 2009). 
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federal legislators and administrative branches seem to be simply reacting to the outcry of 
businesses that the patent system is flawed and hurting the economy by using quick-fix 
patent law reforms. These government actions might make patent litigation a slightly less 
nurturing environment for patent trolls, especially by increasing the risk of losing a 
lawsuit. However, the most progressive proposals would also weaken the patent system 
as a whole by inhibiting the ability of some legitimate patent holders to litigate good 
faith, non-frivolous patent claims.125 For instance, as discussed supra Part II.B., the 
SHIELD Act and the Innovation Act are over-inclusive because they punish non-
predatory PAEs with meritorious complaints. These unintended consequences and 
constraints on patent enforcement could inhibit legitimate claims, devalue patents, and 
endanger future innovation.126 In addition, these proposals might impede the free transfer 
of patents, which helps entities—often individual inventors—move assets in return for 
capital, and allows the recirculation of capital to investors from failed companies. 
III. RULE 11 ANALYSES FOR CLAIMS OF PATENT INFRINGEMENT  
¶60  Irrespective of one’s view on the positives or negatives of patent trolling, the 
economics of patent trolling indisputably rely on high patent litigation costs and 
inefficiencies in the patent litigation system, both of which help NPEs monetize patents 
by threatening to bring dubious claims and forcing businesses to pay unwarranted license 
fees. Some of these inefficiencies stem from the sheer complexity and cost of patent 
litigation in general. However, other inefficiencies are caused simply by the structure and 
design of civil procedural rules. To combat the latter, this Article proposes that district 
courts use a specialized Rule 11-based approach that imposes sanctions against parties 
who objectively appear to be patent trolling.  
A. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 11 Background 
¶61  Attempts to manipulate and take advantage of inefficiencies in the legal system are 
not new. In 1937, when the Supreme Court proposed the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure (FRCP), the Court was concerned about frivolous lawsuits.127 Rule 11 of the 
FRCP clearly renounces any conduct before the court that serves “an improper purpose 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation.”128 
 
125 See Hon. Paul Michel, C.J., Fed. Cir., Address at the 15th Annual Niro Distinguished Intellectual 
Property Lecture: How to Retain Patent Enforcement While Reforming It—Judges and Counsel Should 
Manage Infringement Suits, Not Congress (Oct. 15, 2013) (“If passed, the bills separately and together 
would weaken the patent system; not strengthen it. None of these current bills would address the problems 
with the current patent system: litigation is slow, complicated and unpredictable. The bills, however, would 
make litigation slower, more complicated and less predictable.”); David J. Kappos, Op-Ed., Let’s Not Miss 
this Opportunity for Consensus-Based Patent Reform, THE HILL (Dec. 5, 2013), http://thehill.com/opinion/ 
op-ed/192063-lets-not-miss-this-opportunity-for-consensus-based-patent-reform (“[S]ome are using the 
need to address the patent troll issue as cover to unnecessarily weaken our nation’s patent laws.”). 
126 See Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Internet of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 49 (2013) (testimony of C. Graham Gerst, Global IP Law Grp., LLC) (urging 
Congress not to pass the SHIELD Act or other patent reforms involving cost shifting). 
127 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (1937). 
128 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1). 
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¶62  The main purpose of Rule 11 is to deter improper litigious conduct and reduce the 
growing cost and burdensomeness of civil litigation.129 Rule 11 arises from the 
judiciary’s inherent equity powers, one of which is the ability to sanction both parties and 
attorneys for certain actions. This punishable conduct includes engaging in frivolous or 
vexatious litigation.130 
¶63  In U.S. courts, an attorney of record must sign every pleading, written motion, and 
other paper, unless the party is unrepresented.131 By signing, the attorney certifies to the 
court that the paper is not frivolous in its content and purpose to the best of the attorney’s 
knowledge, information, and belief.132 Similarly, an unrepresented party must certify 
every paper submitted to the court.133 Therefore, in theory, neither side should 
intentionally harass, unnecessarily delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation, 
except under the threat of sanctions. 
¶64  Rule 11 imposes requirements for both asserted facts and legal arguments. It 
mandates that factual contentions before a court “have evidentiary support or, if 
specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable 
opportunity for further investigation or discovery.”134 And it requires that “the claims, 
defenses, or other legal contentions” before a court be “warranted by existing law or by a 
non-frivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for 
establishing new law.”135 
¶65  If Rule 11 sanctions are proper, the court has discretion to impose punishment on 
the attorney and/or the party.136 The power of the court to sanction attorneys for frivolous 
complaint filing was a continuation of former Federal Equity Rule 24, which punished 
perceived litigation abuses by weeding out frivolous, unnecessary, or unfounded 
pleadings.137 According to the 1983 amendment, Rule 11 sanctions were mandatory if the 
elements were met; however, such a strict approach turned out to be unsuccessful in 
practice, and Rule 11 was eventually modified such that sanctions are now available on a 
 
129 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1993); see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, 
709 n.42 (1997) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(2)) (“[Rule 11 sanctions] may be set at a level ‘sufficient to 
deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated.’”); Donaldson v. Clark, 
819 F.2d 1551, 1559 (11th Cir. 1987) (en banc). 
130 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1993) (“Since its original promulgation, Rule 
11 has provided for the striking of pleadings and the imposition of disciplinary sanctions to check abuses in 
the signing of pleadings. Its provisions have always applied to motions and other papers by virtue of 
incorporation by reference in Rule 7(b)(2). The amendment and the addition of Rule 7(b)(3) expressly 
confirms this applicability.”); see, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 40–41 (1991). 
131 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(a). 




136 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (“[T]he court may impose an appropriate sanction on any attorney, law 
firm, or party.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (“Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any  
court . . . who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by 
the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because 
of such conduct.”). Although Rule 11 has been silent on the point, courts have claimed the power to impose 
sanctions on an attorney personally, either by imposing costs or holding them in contempt of court. See 5 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL § 1334 
(1969); 6 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 11.02 (2d ed. 1988). 
137 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1937). 
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discretionary basis after a party to the litigation files a motion.138 In addition, the FRCP 
expressly give the district courts discretion to file sua sponte motions for Rule 11 
sanctions because courts appeared reluctant to intervene without a request from one of 
the parties to the litigation.139 Today, federal courts have tremendous discretion to 
proactively detect and punish Rule 11 violations to deter inappropriate conduct and 
ensure the proper operation of the legal system. 
B. Rule 11 and Asserting Patent Infringement Claims:  
Reasonable Pre-Filing Investigation 
¶66  The following sections explain the current application of Rule 11 sanctions in the 
context of assertions of patent infringement. In a patent case invoking Rule 11 sanctions, 
“courts are often asked to weigh whether the substantive allegations are so weak that they 
are not grounded in fact and legally tenable.”140 A party claiming patent infringement 
must perform a good faith, two-step analysis before filing the lawsuit or counterclaim. 
That said, Rule 11 awards against signing attorneys appear to occur less frequently in 
patent infringement cases than those resulting from the Patent Statute’s cost-shifting 
provisions for “exceptional” cases.141 
1. Standards for Enforcing Rule 11 Sanctions for Bad-Faith Patent  
Infringement Assertions 
¶67  Through appellate opinions, the Federal Circuit has shaped Rule 11 jurisprudence 
in the context of patent infringement.142 Generally, Rule 11 requires all factual 
contentions to have sufficient evidentiary support or at least a likelihood thereof 
following discovery. It further requires that all claims be either warranted by existing 
law, or in the alternative, based on a non-frivolous argument to change the law.143 
¶68  For patent infringement claims, Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed if the claimant’s 
attorney fails to perform a reasonable inquiry, often evinced by improper due diligence. 
Stated broadly, attorneys must adequately investigate the facts prior to filing the claim of 
infringement.144 Currently, the Federal Circuit has two reasonable inquiry requirements, 
the failure to meet either of which can justify enforcing Rule 11 sanctions.145 A 
reasonable inquiry requires a good-faith effort to 1) construe the patent claims to the 
extent necessary to support the claim and 2) compare the patent claim to the accused 
 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (“[T]he power of the court to act on its own initiative is retained.”); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory 
committee’s note (amended 1983) (“Courts currently appear to believe they may impose sanctions on their 
own motion. See N. Am. Trading Corp. v. Zale Corp., 83 F.R.D. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). Authority to do so 
has been made explicit in order to overcome the traditional reluctance of courts to intervene unless 
requested to do so by one of the parties.”). 
140 Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
141 See supra notes 26–27 and accompanying text. 
142 See Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997); S. Bravo Sys., Inc. v. Containment 
Techs. Corp., 96 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
143 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
144 See Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
145 See, e.g., S. Bravo Sys., Inc., 96 F.3d at 1373 (vacating district court order denying Rule 11 sanctions 
and remanding for further consideration where attorney had apparently failed to conduct an adequate 
inquiry). 
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infringer’s product, apparatus, or method.146 Under the former, the claimant’s attorney 
has a pre-filing duty to independently and reasonably construe the patent claim(s). Under 
the latter, the claimant’s attorney has a pre-filing duty to investigate the infringement 
accusation(s) by exhausting all publicly available material and information, such as by 
obtaining or inspecting the accused infringer’s product or process.147 
¶69  Each regional circuit can have its own circuit-specific Rule 11 standards because, 
when reviewing patent cases, the Federal Circuit defers to each regional circuit law as 
long as a certain issue is not exclusive to patent law.148 However, regional circuit 
standards are generally uniform, as all have adopted an objective standard with only 
slight variations in specific language.149 The consensus is that at the time of filing a 
complaint for patent infringement: 1) the claimant must independently construe the patent 
claim, 2) the claim construction must be objectively sound, and 3) the claimant must 
make the infringement judgment after exhausting all available methods publicly 
known.150 
2. Attorney’s Independent and Objectively Reasonable Construction of the Patent Claim 
¶70  For the first reasonable inquiry requirement, the claimant must be able to provide 
adequate support for a claim construction that renders the alleged infringer’s conduct 
within the scope of the claim(s).151 Because this judgment depends on a question of law 
as to claim construction, it is subject to the Rule 11(b)(2) requirement that all legal 
arguments be non-frivolous.152 Therefore, an attorney seeking to file a patent 
infringement claim should not rely solely on her client’s claim interpretation. Instead, the 
attorney has an affirmative duty to perform an independent claim analysis.153 
¶71  In South Bravo Systems v. Containment Technologies, the plaintiff’s lawyers failed 
to independently construe the patent claims at issue and compare their claim construction 
with the accused devices or products.154 Although the patentee conferred with the lawyer 
regarding his observation of the accused device, such blind reliance on a lay opinion was 
sanctionable.155 
 
146 Id. at 1375. 
147 See Judin, 110 F.3d at 784–85. 
148 See Kathleen M. Dorr, Annotation, Comment Note—General Principles Regarding Imposition of 
Sanctions Under Rule 11, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 95 A.L.R. FED. 107, § 6(a) (1989); see, e.g., 
Biodex Corp. v. Loredan Biomedical, Inc., 946 F.2d 850, 857–58 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“[O]ur practice has 
been to defer to regional circuit law when the precise issue involves an interpretation of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure or the local rules of the district court.”). 
149 See Dorr, supra note 148. 
150 S. Bravo, 96 F.3d at 1375. 
151 Judin, 110 F.3d at 784. 
152 Id. Sua sponte motions put the burden on the party to be sanctioned to show the justification for his 
or her actions under Rule 11. Id.; see, e.g., Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987) (en 
banc) (“The accused must be given an opportunity to respond, orally or in writing as may be appropriate, to 
the invocation of Rule 11 and to justify his or her actions.”). 
153 See Judin, 110 F.3d at 784. 
154 S. Bravo, 96 F.3d at 1374. 
155 Id. at 1375 (finding district court abused its discretion because “there [was] no evidence that either of 
[patentee’s] attorneys ever compared the accused devices with the patent claims”). The Federal Circuit 
opined that blind reliance on a lay client for the factual and legal questions of infringement would rarely 
constitute a reasonable inquiry under Rule 11. See id. 
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¶72  In addition, the claim construction must read on the apparatus or process/method, 
and under Rule 11(b)(3) there must be evidentiary support for all factual allegations as to 
the infringement.156 Because all questions of fact will be determined later in litigation, 
this requirement of evidentiary support is germane to not overstretching Rule 11 
sanctions. In fact, the sufficiency of evidentiary support should be determined based not 
on the court’s (therefore the correct) claim construction, but on any independent, good-
faith construction relied on in the complaint.157 
¶73  For example, in Antonious v. Spaulding & Evenflo Companies, Rule 11 sanctions 
were not proper even though the plaintiff attorneys’ patent claim construction was 
inconsistent with the court’s claim construction because the claimant’s argued-for claim 
construction was not frivolous.158 Although the court’s claim construction did not read on 
the accused-infringer’s products—and thus no patent infringement could be found—this 
was immaterial. Because the evidence supported the claimant’s construction and read on 
the accused-infringer’s products, the argument was not frivolous.159 
¶74  Additionally, preclusive effects from concurrent proceedings can affect inquiries 
for Rule 11 sanctions. In Phonometrics, Inc. v. Economy Inns of America, the claimant 
owned a patent claiming a device that computed, recorded, and showed the cost of long-
distance phone calls via a digital display, which he accused the hotel chain of 
infringing.160 The patent owner had previously sued various manufacturers and sellers of 
telephone equipment on similar grounds in cases still pending at the time of filing.161 He 
was meanwhile also engaged in various lawsuits against other hotel chains.162 The 
specific complaint in Phonometrics was based on a claim construction where a digital 
display showed the cost of a long-distance phone call to anyone, including hotel 
employees.163 
¶75  In one of the manufacturing lawsuits, the Federal Circuit ruled on its claim 
construction and disagreed with the patent owner’s construction, holding that the claim 
limitation “digital display” did not include a machine-readable device.164 Subsequently, 
the Federal Circuit concluded that the language “substantially instantaneous” limited the 
 
156 Antonious v. Spaulding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A]n attorney 
violates Rule 11(b)(3) when an objectively reasonable attorney would not believe, based on some actual 
evidence uncovered during prefiling investigation, that each claim limitation reads on the accused device 
literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.”). 
157 Id. 
158 Id. at 1068–71. 
159 When reviewing a determination of the first reasonable inquiry requirement, the Federal Circuit must 
apply the standard of the regional circuit that the case was appealed from because it is a question of law. 
Antonious, 275 F.3d at 1072. “[T]o satisfy that requirement, there must be ‘some basis in law’ to support 
each legal argument in the complaint.” Id. For instance, under the Fourth Circuit’s standard, a claim 
construction would be unjustified if a reasonable lawyer would recognize it as frivolous. See Cox v. 
Saunders, 136 F.3d 349, 352 (4th Cir. 1998). 
160 Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
161 See, e.g., Intellicall, Inc. v. Phonometrics, Inc., 952 F.2d 1384, 1387 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
162 Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1358–59. 
163 The previous court held the patent claim language “digital display” did not include machine-readable 
devices, but it did not require that the display be shown directly to the persons placing the calls. 
Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1367. Therefore, the plaintiff may have properly argued that one employed by 
the hotel must have access to some display, thus infringing the patent. See id. at 1359. But see 
Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom Inc., 133 F.3d 1459, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
164 Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1358–59. 
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claim scope for the “digital display.”  As a result, the Phonometrics court held that only a 
hotel-guest caller, and not any hotel employees, must be able to perceive the cost of a 
long-distance call through a digital display during and after the call to warrant 
infringement.165 
¶76  The defendants in Phonometrics moved for Rule 11 sanctions against the attorney 
that filed the patent infringement complaint.166 The district court granted Rule 11 
sanctions, which the Federal Circuit upheld based on two premises: 1) the patent 
infringement claimant must voluntary dismiss any claims incongruent with a precedential 
claim construction, even if the precedent came down after the filing of the claim,167 and 
2) although it is possible to abolish a precedential claim construction from a previous 
case during litigation, the precedential claim construction is binding against subsequent 
litigants within the same context.168 
3. Infringement Judgment Only After Exhausting All Publicly Available  
Materials and Information 
¶77  For the second reasonable inquiry requirement, the claimant’s attorney must 
attempt to obtain or inspect an allegedly infringing product, apparatus, or process before 
making an infringement judgment. Attempts to obtain or inspect must exhaust all 
publicly available methods possible without judicial recourse. 
¶78  In Judin v. United States, the Federal Circuit reversed a denial of Rule 11 sanctions, 
ruling that a lack of due diligence in trying to obtain or inspect a non-consumer 
product—a barcode scanner used by the U.S. Post Office—was sanctionable.169 This 
holding is particularly striking because the Federal Circuit showed very little leniency to 
the reality that the claimant’s claim construction obviated the necessity of a close 
inspection of the accused device.170 Thus, the second step could be that the claimant must 
at least attempt to obtain or inspect the accused infringer’s product or process, even if it is 
impossible to do so, regardless of the necessity to examine the product before concluding 
that the patent claim reads on it.171 
¶79  Conversely, in Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Company, the Federal Circuit 
affirmed a denial of Rule 11 sanctions even though the claimant performed only cursory 
analysis of the defendant’s product.172 Q-Pharma sued a lotion manufacturer for 
 
165 Id. at 1359. 
166 Id. at 1360. 
167 Id. at 1361 (discussing how Rule 11 applies to later advocating “untenable contentions made in 
previously-filed papers”). 
168 Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1362–63. On the other hand, Judge Newman would have vacated the 
sanctions because the claim construction in Northern Telecom was only non-precedential dicta outside the 
context of an equipment-manufacturer defendant, and similarly, the Choice Hotels opinion was non-
precedential. Phonometrics, 349 F.3d at 1367–68 (Newman, C.J., dissenting) (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. 
N. Telecom, Inc., 133 F.3d 1459 (Fed. Cir. 1998), and Phonometrics, Inc. v. Choice Hotels Int’l, Inc., 21 F. 
App’x 910, 2001 WL 1217219 (Fed. Cir. 2001)). 
169 Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
170 Id. at 783 (“[A] more thoughtful pre-filing examination would not likely have deterred Judin’s 
interest in the suit.”). 
171 See id. at 782; see, e.g., View Eng’g Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981 (Fed. Cir. 2000); 
Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn 
Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
172 Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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infringing its patent related to lotions containing Coenzyme Q10 (CoQ10).173 Rule 11 
sanctions were not imposed against Q-Pharma’s attorneys for failure to perform a 
chemical analysis before filing the patent infringement claim to confirm the composition 
of the allegedly infringing lotion.174 The court held that Q-Pharma’s attorneys met the 
Rule 11 requirements by 1) interpreting the patent and concluding the limitation, 
“therapeutically effective amount,” meant any amount with no specified threshold, and 2) 
acquiring a sample of the CoQ10 lotion to review its label and other advertising materials 
in order to conclude that the lotion contained at least some CoQ10.175 
¶80  Further, parties asserting counterclaims are similarly required to fulfill the 
reasonable inquiry requirements. In View Engineering Inc. v. Robotic Vision Systems, 
Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed an imposition of Rule 11 sanctions against a defendant 
who failed to exhaust the judicial process in its pre-claim investigation.176 View 
Engineering initially sued Robotic Vision Systems (Robotic) for patent infringement of 
View Engineering’s patent.177 In response, Robotic’s attorney brought counterclaims for 
patent infringement of several of Robotic’s patents.178 The pre-filing investigation by 
Robotic’s attorney merely consisted of obtaining advertising materials because “View 
[Engineering] refused to permit examination of its machine or drawings.”179 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the sanctions against Robotic’s attorney by reasoning that the attorney 
“had the opportunity to file immediately for the protective order that eventually resulted 
in discovery.”180 Following this logic, the pre-complaint-filing inquiry should not end 
until all publicly available options are exhausted, including judicial recourse in case of 
counterclaims. 
¶81  While the Q-Pharma opinion is on the lenient side and the View Engineering 
opinion is on the strict side, the Federal Circuit distinguished Q-Pharma from View 
Engineering in that “an infringement analysis can simply consist of a good faith, 
informed comparison of the claims of a patent against the accused subject matter.”181 The 
Federal Circuit held that Q-Pharma’s claim interpretation was independent and made in 
good faith, and that it had obtained and analyzed the accused product to the point where 
the analysis led to a plausible infringement claim,182 whereas in View Engineering, 
Robotic’s attorney seemed to have quickly filed a counterclaim of patent infringement 
without adequate due diligence. 
4. Putting the Two Steps of the Reasonable Inquiry Together 
¶82  The PAE must attempt to obtain or inspect infringing products or processes 
regardless of its necessity determined upon completion of the first reasonable inquiry 
step. However, the PAE may stop performing due diligence at the point when observation 
 
173 Id. at 1297–98. 
174 Id. at 1297, 1300. 
175 Id. at 1301. 
176 View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 981. 
177 Id. at 982. 
178 Id. 
179 Id. at 985. 
180 Id. at 986. 
181 Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
182 Id. 
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or analysis of the accused apparatus or method leads to a plausible claim of infringement 
upon the independent and good-faith claim construction from the first step. 
¶83  A plausible excuse for stopping the second reasonable inquiry step, which might 
fulfill the Rule 11 duty, must be distinguished from a plausible claim of infringement. In 
View Engineering, Rule 11 sanctions were warranted when a party only asked the other 
party to cooperate, which turned out to be futile, and did not follow through by 
petitioning for judicial recourse to compel cooperation.183 Although the original 
defendant raised the excuse of the plaintiff’s lack of cooperation with regard to the 
production of certain information, without attempting to exhaust any available judicial 
recourse, the second step was inadequate under Rule 11.184 
¶84  Nonetheless, there is an impracticability excuse for ending the second step inquiry 
without obtaining adequate evidentiary support for infringement claims. Such an 
excusable circumstance was found in Hoffman La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., where a 
product made by a patented process was reverse engineered by a competitor. However, 
the details of the competitor’s manufacturing process were concealed from the public, 
which further contributed to the patent owner’s suspicions.185 The patent owner sued for 
patent infringement of its manufacturing process, and stated, “plaintiffs are presently not 
aware of any analytical technique which can be used to definitively establish that the 
[generic form of defendant’s proprietary drug] was made by use of the invention of one 
or more claims of the [plaintiff’s patents].”186 Over the course of litigation, the defendant 
disclosed the process at issue, and the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the lawsuit after 
concluding non-infringement.187 
¶85  Subsequently, the defendant moved for Rule 11 sanctions.188 The Federal Circuit 
agreed with the district court’s denial of Rule 11 sanctions where, although the plaintiffs 
could have assumed a lack of factual support for non-infringement when the pre-filing 
investigation met a dead-end, they chose to file suit to engage in discovery. 189 Therefore, 
the patent holder could seek judicial recourse to investigate the infringement where there 
was no practical alternative to discovery.190 
¶86  Parties can detail the reasonable inquiry requirements under Rule 11 before filing a 
complaint. The claimant’s attorney must: 1) independently construe the patent claims in 
good faith, which may differ from the court’s construction; 2) initiate a factual 
investigation even though their independent claim construction obviated this necessity in 
the abstract; and 3) continue the factual investigation until the facts lead to a plausible 
claim of infringement or the investigation becomes impracticable by all publicly 
available means other than filing the complaint. In addition, it should be noted that courts 
 
183 View Eng’g, 208 F.3d at 986. 
184 Id. 
185 Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 1364. 
188 Id. at 1362. 
189 Id. at 1363 (“[Defendant] refused to disclose the manufacturing processes because of a 
confidentiality agreement it had with the manufacturer.”). 
190 Id. at 1364–65 (“[The plaintiff in Cambridge] had tested a sample of the allegedly infringing product 
and had commissioned further chemical analyses and acquired documentary evidence that appeared to 
confirm that the product alleged to infringe fell within the chemical specifications of the patented method. 
Without the aid of discovery, any further information was not practicably obtainable.”) (quoting Cambridge 
Prods. Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
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cannot base a Rule 11 sanction exclusively on incongruence between its claim 
construction and the claimant’s claim construction.191 
5. New Legal Theories and Arguing for a Change of Law 
¶87  Despite preclusive effects and Rule 11 sanctions, parties may argue for a change in 
the law if the argument is non-frivolous.192 However, the time and place of the argument 
for a change of law matters. In Phonometrics, the litigant’s insistence on the same claim 
construction despite previous contradicting final judgments resulted in a proper finding of 
Rule 11 sanctions.193 The Federal Circuit implied that if the attorney wanted to make an 
argument for a change of law, the attorney should have appealed the previous rulings, 
rather than sue different defendants and then argue for a change in claim construction.194 
¶88  It makes sense that a claimant may not argue for a change of the claim construction 
simply because he sues different defendants. While the claimant should not be 
discouraged from bringing lawsuits against other defendants after a single lawsuit fails, 
courts should not waste time and resources reading and interpreting the same patent, and 
should only rely on the factual differences when an opposite result is clearly warranted. 
6. Recent Developments in Rule 11 Jurisprudence: Acknowledging Patent Trolling 
¶89  In Eon-Net v. Flagstar Bancorp, the district court held that Eon-Net brought a 
baseless claim in bad faith because its patent claim construction was unwarranted by the 
written description and the lawsuit exhibited “indicia of extortion.”195 Eon-Net had filed 
nearly identical patent infringement complaints against almost one hundred different 
defendants and offered quick settlements at prices far below the cost of litigation.196 On 
appeal, the Federal Circuit upheld the district court’s imposition of Rule 11 sanctions 
against Eon-Net.197 
¶90  Eon-Net was a holding company for a patent portfolio of document-processing 
systems. The district court found that Eon-Net did not perform an objective evaluation of 
the claim and thus failed to satisfy the Rule 11 requirements.198 The court ordered Eon-
Net to pay over $600,000 in Rule 11 sanctions plus all legal costs. This order followed 
the court’s declaration that this was an exceptional case pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 285.199 
These financial sanctions roughly equated with the cost of litigation if the parties had 
reached the summary judgment stage in the district court. 
 
191 See Antonious v. Spaulding & Evenflo Cos., 275 F.3d 1066, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
192 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2). 
193 Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
194 See id. at 1363 (“However sincere Phonometrics and Mr. Sutton may be in their belief that the 
construction of the limitation at issue stated in Northern Telecom, and reiterated and followed ‘[u]nder 
principles of stare decisis’ in Choice Hotels and by the district court in case after case brought by 
Phonometrics, is incorrect, their position is simply without legal merit.”). 
195 Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
196 Id. Eon-Net’s previous settlement offers were based on sales by the defendant. For example, 
“$25,000 for sales less than $3,000,000; $50,000 for sales between $3,000,000 and $20,000,000; and 
$75,000 for sales between $20,000,000 and $100,000,000.” Id. at 1327.  
197 Id. at 1328–29. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 1320. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 4  
 
 324
¶91  The plaintiff in Eon-Net tried to examine the defendant’s website, which allegedly 
infringed Eon-Net’s patent on a document-processing system. The court noted that a 
proper pre-filing investigation “requires counsel to perform an objective evaluation of the 
claim terms when reading those terms on the accused device.”200 The district court found 
that Eon-Net brought a baseless claim in bad faith because its claim construction was 
unwarranted by the written description. Furthermore, the court noted that Eon-Net 
showed “indicia of extortion” by bringing multiple claims demanding quick settlements 
at prices below the cost of defending the litigations.201 Regardless of how well the claim 
construction read on the accused website, because Eon-Net did not perform an objective 
evaluation of the claim, it failed to satisfy the Rule 11 requirements.202 On appeal, the 
Federal Circuit explained that the defendant did not infringe any claim at issue based on 
the patent disclosure, despite the plaintiff’s attempt to contradict its own patent 
disclosure.203 
¶92  The Federal Circuit explicitly acknowledged both the patent system’s tendency of 
imposing high costs on accused infringers regardless of their liability, and how easily 
NPE’s can manipulate the system because they are immune to counterclaims.204 Eon-Net 
might lose some “licensing revenue should its patents be found invalid or if a court 
narrowly construed the patents,” but it would not “face any business risk resulting from 
the loss of patent protection over a product or process.”205 And concerning public 
relations, Eon-Net would have little to lose while accused infringers faced the possibility 
of being viewed as patent infringers by the public.206 Furthermore, defendants were 
required to answer complaints and comply with other court proceedings, including 
discovery, without any assurance of recovering litigation costs due to the American Rule. 
¶93  Notwithstanding the court’s recognition of Eon-Net’s status as a patent troll, the 
precedent created by Eon-Net falls short of Rule 11’s potential to prevent frivolous and 
unfounded pleadings. Because the court relied on the filing of a Rule 11 motion after the 
defendant had incurred significant litigation expenses (such as discovery costs), the 
application of Rule 11 sanctions in this manner does little to dissuade patent trolling 
generally. As discussed supra Part I, patent-trolling behavior pressures defendants to 
settle before filing the infringement lawsuit because of both the uncertainty of 
reimbursement for litigation costs and the threat of an injunction against ongoing 
business. In addition, a Rule 11 motion is subject to Rule 11 sanctions, which adds extra 
costs to filing Rule 11 motions. In sum, the delayed application of Rule 11 sanctions does 
little to combat patent trolling because financially prudent and litigation-wary defendants 
are nevertheless still compelled to agree either to a license fee or settlement payoff. 
¶94  And although courts may openly acknowledge the legal asymmetries in patent-troll 
litigation, Rule 11 sanctions must nevertheless be imposed based on objective criteria. 
For instance, the Eastern District of Texas similarly acknowledged the suitability of Rule 
11 sanctions for exploitative patent trolling in Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, 
 
200 Id. at 1329. 
201 Id. at 1326. 
202 Id. at 1329. 
203 Id. at 1323. 
204 Id. at 1327. 
205 Id. at 1327–28. 
206 Id. at 1327. 
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where a patent owner of technology for a handheld, police-ticketing device sued multiple 
defendants for patent infringement. After the cases were consolidated,207 the defendants 
moved for Rule 11 sanctions, as well as attorneys’ fees and legal costs for being an 
exceptional case.208 The district court considered whether the arguments for damages 
were not credible and if the lawsuit had been “brought only to coerce a nuisance value 
settlement.”209 The district court’s Rule 11 inquiry involved analyzing “Raylon’s 
damages model and early settlements to determine whether it brought its suits in good 
faith or merely to obtain nuisance value settlements.”210 The court opined that “in some 
situations, a plaintiff asserting a large damages model while making very low offers in 
the case may indicate that the plaintiff realizes its case is very weak or even frivolous,” 
and that the amount of damages may be “indicative of the good faith nature with which 
the case is brought.”211 The district court concluded that Raylon’s subjective intent in 
bringing the suit was not in bad faith and denied Rule 11 sanctions.212 
¶95  On appeal, the Federal Circuit disagreed with the district court’s Rule 11 
analysis.213 The Federal Circuit reiterated that the standard for Rule 11 is an objective 
one, meaning the subjective intent of the patent infringement claimant in bringing the 
lawsuit is irrelevant.214 Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “the standard under which an 
attorney is measured is an objective, not subjective standard of reasonableness under the 
circumstances.”215 However, the Federal Circuit still found Raylon’s proposed claim 
construction to be frivolous because its argument about the pivotally mounted display 
being adjustable from the viewer’s perspective instead of relative to the device housing 
was such that “no reasonable litigant could reasonably expect success on the merits,” and 
thus warranted Rule 11 sanctions.216  
IV. PROPOSAL FOR A NEW RULE 11 INQUISITION FOR PATENT INFRINGEMENT CLAIMANTS 
¶96  Unfortunately, the current passive application of Rule 11 falls short of its potential 
to shield commercially active businesses from patent trolling. The main problem with the 
current application of Rule 11 is that defendants must proceed well into litigation, 
expending time and money, just to get to a potentially favorable Rule 11 motion ruling. 
In addition, regardless of how the litigation turns out, the PAE may repeatedly go after 
other defendants, again aiming for either settlements or license fees. 
¶97  However, existing civil procedure can help combat the patent-trolling problem 
based on this Article’s proposed application of Rule 11, which uses a predefined, suspect-
classification model to identify certain parties that assert patents in bad faith. 
 
207 Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
208 Id. at 1365, 1370. 
209 Id. at 1368. 
210 Id. at 1367–68. 
211 Id. at 1368. 
212 Id. at 1372. 
213 Id. at 1371. 
214 Id. at 1373. 
215 Id. at 1367 (quoting Whitehead v. Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2003)). 
216 Id. at 1370. Raylon argued for a claim construction that included a “display being capable of being 
moved or pivoted relative to the viewer’s perspective” without any support for this in the patent and 
contrary statements made during prosecution. Id. at 1368. 
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A. Applying Rule 11 Sua Sponte: Using a Suspect Class to Combat Patent Trolling 
¶98  As an equity rule, Rule 11 sanctions can be applied sua sponte, which gives the 
court discretion as to the imposition of sanctions.217 This equity-driven approach has 
significant advantages, such as flexibility and the potential for immediate 
implementation, as opposed to legislative or administrative action. First, courts can apply 
this model flexibly because no set criteria define what constitutes judicially sanctionable 
conduct.218 This flexibility is especially advantageous because patent trolls can adjust 
their strategies quickly to new statutes and regulations. Second, it does not require new 
legislation or agency rulemaking because the legislative history and underlying policies 
of Rule 11 endorse the federal judiciary’s inherent equity power. 
¶99  Furthermore, a sua sponte approach moves the inquiry to an earlier stage, which 
protects the commercially active defendant from expending unnecessary legal costs just 
to get a chance to move for Rule 11 sanctions. The sua sponte approach can also delay 
the proceedings before the defendant is even required to file an answer, further lessening 
the accumulation of legal costs for the defendant. By aggressively implementing sua 
sponte Rule 11 motions, courts can frontload a more stringent pleading burden on suspect 
patent infringement claimants. In order to satisfy the reasonable inquiry requirements of 
Rule 11, the PAE must persuade the court that its own claim construction reads on the 
accused apparatus or method. Unless there is a showing of both legitimate factual and 
legal grounds supporting the infringement, the defendant would not have to meet any 
burden of proof until the court denies the Rule 11 motion. 
¶100  In addition, courts may use Rule 11 sanctions to create preclusive-type effects or 
injunctions. For instance, a court could temporarily ban the PAE from filing generic 
patent infringement complaints against other defendants unless the PAE can improve the 
grounds for its complaint by performing the sufficient pre-litigation investigation 
required to pass Rule 11 muster. 
¶101  This proposed application of Rule 11 requires courts to proactively detect 
complaints filed as a part of a patent-trolling strategy. By defining a suspect class that is 
predisposed to patent trolling, courts will be able to selectively apply increased scrutiny 
for patent infringement assertions. Stated broadly, courts should first look to the PAE’s 
complaint to determine whether this heightened scrutiny should apply. Then, when a 
court identifies the PAE as a member of the suspect class, it should move sua sponte for a 
Rule 11 hearing. In this hearing, the claimant is required to prove that the legal complaint 
is 1) based on an independent and reasonable claim construction, and 2) supported by 
sufficient facts that lead to a conclusion of infringement, or by an appropriate reason not 
to include such facts. 
B. Suspect-Class Factors Indicative of Bad-Faith Patent Assertion 
¶102  There are many characteristics and behaviors indicative of patent trolling, as 
mentioned in Part I. In order to create an easy-to-apply test, quantitatively measurable 
 
217 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note (amended 1993) (“[T]he power of the court to act on its 
own initiative is retained.”). 
218 See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50 (1991) (“[I]f in the informed discretion of the 
court, neither the statute nor the Rules are up to the task, the court may safely rely on its inherent power [to 
impose sanctions].”). 
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characteristics are preferable, relieving the court from having to conduct significant in 
depth inquiry, while also providing a mechanism to avoid both undue delay and 
unnecessary diversion of court resources. 
¶103  A suspect class of patent infringement claimants can be defined by certain indicia 
of patent trolling. Some easily determinable characteristics indicative of a predisposition 
to patent trolling are: 1) the litigant was not in privity of employment with the named 
inventor, including through subsidiaries, affiliates, or its business predecessor or 
successor (leaving merely a relationship through contract originating from the transfer of 
intellectual property); 2) the litigant does not make available any commercial products or 
services in relation to the patent; and 3) the litigant’s lines of business for the past three 
years share no commonality with the subject matter of the patent. If two or more of the 
mentioned characteristics apply, the entity’s patent infringement complaint should be 
subject to increased scrutiny. 
¶104  These objective characteristics help a court discern whether the entity intends to use 
the patented technology for the public good, or in the alternative, is relying on patents 
solely as a predatory financial scheme or exploitive core-business model. In contrast, 
entities offering products or services are presumed to be less likely to engage in bad-faith 
patent assertion and are thus held to the traditional level of scrutiny. 
¶105  Although looking directly at the conduct of the PAE most accurately identifies 
patent trolling, a predisposed suspect-class approach is preferable. Discussed supra Part I, 
some entities that are not patent trolls engage in patent-trolling-like conduct, and 
similarly, some NPE’s have legitimate patent infringement claims. The proposed suspect-
class approach triggers the specialized scrutiny even if the PAE is not a patent troll and 
helps courts evaluate a claimant’s good faith on a claim-by-claim basis. Similarly, a NPE 
with a legitimate assertion of patent infringement should easily pass the sua sponte Rule 
11 inquiry. 
¶106  As discussed previously, a patent holder may choose to send cease-and-desist 
letters in bad faith where the letters offer licensing deals just below the cost of litigation 
to coerce payoffs. Further, this payoff often occurs even though the patent is either 
invalid or not infringed. While bargain-licensing deals for worthless patents indicate 
typical patent-trolling behavior, to determine whether a patent is valid and infringed, and 
that the licensing fees are reasonable, the litigation must proceed beyond the Markman 
hearing stage. 
¶107  But the proposed sua sponte model ameliorates this issue by frontloading the 
claimant’s burden of proof. For example, during a Rule 11 motion hearing, courts inquire 
into previous litigations brought by the party with regard to the same patent.219 If any of 
these previous litigations proceeded to the Markman hearing stage, courts are able to 
compare the claim construction in question to the precedential one. However, Rule 11 
explicitly allows “a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law.” While this provides leeway for a complaint 
based on a frivolous construction, the purpose of the proposed sua sponte approach is to 
frontload the plaintiff’s burden of proof rather than to decide Markman hearing matters 
beforehand. 
 
219 See Phonometrics, Inc. v. Econ. Inns of Am., 349 F.3d 1356, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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C. Examples of Applying the Proposed Suspect-Class and Rule 11 Scrutiny Analysis 
¶108  Because there are many characteristics and behaviors indicative of patent trolling, it 
helps to understand this proposed implementation of Rule 11 through hypotheticals. Also, 
it is important to keep in mind that Rule 11 scrutiny should be applied indiscriminately to 
all NPEs, including those not often considered to be patent trolls—universities, individual 
inventors, and startup businesses. 
1. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for the Garden-Variety Patent Troll 
¶109  This proposed application of Rule 11 should trigger scrutiny for Rule 11 sanctions 
for any entity that fits the canonical features of a patent troll. If at least two of the three 
predispositions of patent trolling apply, then the court should move sua sponte for a Rule 
11 inquiry. However, even a true patent troll actively intending to extort a defendant and 
exploit a patent can pass muster if its claim asserts objectively reasonable infringement. 
This allows NPEs to assert their legal rights without imposing additional burdens, and 
causes only a slight deviation in procedure. 
2. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for All NPEs, but May Be Easily  
Satisfied by Some 
¶110  Heightened Rule 11 scrutiny should apply for any NPE not affiliated with the 
inventive entity that produced the patented technology because at least two of the three 
predispositions to patent trolling would be present. Increased scrutiny would not apply to 
university claimants if the university invented the patented technology and developed 
technologies related to the patented subject matter. Again, just as for bona fide patent 
trolls, if an NPE can pass the proposed heightened Rule 11 scrutiny, legitimate claims 
should avoid Rule 11 sanctions with little effort.  
¶111  Imposing higher scrutiny unfortunately might slightly hinder some legitimate 
claims. Take for instance a hypothetical, newly formed group of inventors that make a 
breakthrough that could affect an entire industry. The group of inventors immediately 
acquires a patent for this revolutionary product. But before the group can commercialize 
the product, a well-funded business begins selling a suspiciously identical product. 
Because the inventive group lacks funding, it is unable to commercialize the product. In 
addition, the competitor’s prior litigious behavior and vast amount of financial and legal 
resources make outside investors wary of funding the commercialization of the invention 
and/or the patent litigation required to exclude others. Here, the inventor group’s only 
option is to bring an action against the patent infringers and satisfy the reasonable inquiry 
requirements. If the patent infringement claimant succeeds in the first lawsuit, other 
established companies would theoretically refrain from infringing. Consequently, even 
for this situation, the increased scrutiny approach would allow the NPE with a legitimate 
claim of infringement to experience only a slight delay in compensation for the invention. 
¶112  Importantly, this approach should trigger scrutiny for all identifiable types of 
patent-trolling behavior, regardless of the entity’s status, including universities. However, 
while there is no specific exception for nonprofit institutions, universities should avoid 
Rule 11 sanctions with little effort. As long as the university invented the patented 
technology and researched related technologies, or in the alternative, its pre-litigation 
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investigation is objectively reasonable as required by Rule 11, the university will avoid 
sanctions. Thus, this approach helps courts distinguish between actual patent trolling and 
legitimate patent infringement lawsuits brought by universities, individual inventors, and 
startup companies. 
3. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for Commercially Active Entities 
Engaging in Patent Trolling 
¶113  This proposed application of Rule 11 should trigger scrutiny for patent-trolling 
behavior equally for all claimants, regardless of the type of entity. Even commercially 
active entities might attempt to assert patent claims wholly outside the scope of any of the 
technologies present in their products or only tangentially related to their business. In 
other words, a non-NPE can engage in patent trolling. The proposed indicia of bad-faith 
patent assertion should classify these patent infringement claimants as NPEs for the 
patent claims at issue, which covers technologies outside the scope of the claimant’s 
current products. Then, if one of the other two remaining factors applies, the court should 
move sua sponte for a higher Rule 11 scrutiny. In this way, if the patent infringement 
claimant invented the technology itself or has some affiliation with the inventive entity 
more than merely being an assignee in a chain of title for the patent, then the tangential or 
unrelated claims can pass muster. 
¶114  This aspect of the proposal is important because large, cash-laden corporations 
acting as patent trolls might soon cause the most damage. In the past, the idea of mutually 
assured destruction might have mitigated this threat. For example, the possibility of two 
successful commercial entities wasting millions of dollars suing and countersuing each 
other for patent infringement of unpracticed patents with indiscernible value deterred 
companies from engaging in such conduct.220 But in principle, there is nothing in patent 
law, except competition/antitrust law, that prevents the most commercially successful 
companies from buying patents just to extort income from others, or worse, attempting to 
gain future competitive advantages by destroying smaller companies, which thus thwarts 
the development of new markets. As long as the aforementioned legal asymmetries are 
present and so easily manipulated, patent trolling by these “noncompeting but 
commercially active” entities does just as much harm to judicial efficiency and the 
integrity of patent system as NPE-type patent trolling.221 
4. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Trigger for Patent Aggregators, but May Be 
Easily Satisfied by Some 
¶115  By definition, patent aggregators are NPEs, but they might license various patent 
rights to numerous commercially active entities. Although there is nothing particularly 
unique about aggregators in this discussion, the intent of the entity asserting patent rights 
is important. Instead of a deleterious, bullying tactic, an aggregator’s claim might simply 
be the result of a defensive assertion aimed at protecting its licensee’s patent rights. 
Importantly, the proposed analysis focuses on the legitimacy of the claim. Thus, 
 
220 See BRIAN KAHIN & DOMINIQUE FORAY, ADVANCING KNOWLEDGE AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
4 (Brian Kahin & Dominique Foray eds., 2006). 
221 See RPX CORP. REPORT, supra note 1, at 7. 
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aggregators will get no special treatment. However, courts should consider the claimant’s 
licensing activity and any potential injury to commercially active licensees. 
¶116  In addition, aggregators might use patent pools to create industry standards. This 
type of behavior is economically beneficial for the public and should not create net 
negative effects when those patents are asserted. Under these circumstances, even if no 
one is yet actively practicing the patented technology, courts should not obstruct a 
claimant from asserting a patent claim. Again, the proposed analysis focuses on the 
legitimacy of the claim of patent infringement. 
5. Increased Rule 11 Scrutiny Should Be Triggered by Patent Privateering, but May Be 
Easily Satisfied by Some 
¶117  Patent privateers originate very differently from typical patent trolls because the 
original patent owner invested research into the invention with plans to practice the 
technology. Then, for legal convenience, the original patent owner transfers those rights 
to a closely related entity to monetize the intellectual property in order to recoup its 
investment. However, despite the entity’s history, there is nothing stopping the 
privateering entity from becoming a patent troll. Again, as long as the aforementioned 
legal asymmetries are present and used to manipulate the patent system, the proposed 
application of Rule 11 should sanction these entities for dubious claims of patent 
infringement. In the future, a more nuanced analysis for the lack-of-affiliation factor 
indicative of a predisposition to patent trolling in the proposed inquiry might be 
necessary. 
D. How Courts Could Consider Sua Sponte Rule 11 Motions for  
Patent Infringement Claims 
¶118  This Article proposes that whenever a court encounters a patent infringement claim 
or counterclaim, it should always apply the proposed Rule 11 scrutiny based on whether a 
claimant is a member of a suspect class. The evaluation could work like this: 
(1) When a party files a patent infringement complaint, the court would note the 
named inventor(s) and conduct a quick search of the public patent 
Assignments on the Web and/or Patent Application Information Retrieval 
system (PAIR), both provided by the USPTO, to find the first named 
assignee and any chain of title. Because the first assignee is often an entity 
involved in some relationship with the inventive entity, the first named 
assignee is presumptively not a patent troll. If the first assignee is a patent 
troll, then some reward has passed directly to the inventive entity. 
(2) Next, the court should consider the commercial activities of the claimant by 
performing a simple background search, such as by using Google, if possible, 
to reveal what type of commercial operation, if any, the claimant is 
conducting. 
¶119  If the claimant 1) makes no products even tangentially related to the patented 
technology, and 2) is not the first assignee, then a presumption of a predisposition for 
patent trolling should trigger heightened Rule 11 scrutiny. However, if there has been 
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more than one assignment due to a merger or acquisition, and the claimant makes no 
products, courts should delay applying heightened scrutiny for a reasonable amount of 
time, measured by the amount of time a reasonable company needs to develop a similar 
product. 
¶120  If it is determined that the claimant is a member of the suspect class, then the court 
should move sua sponte for a Rule 11 hearing. Courts could use the order below as a 
template. 
ORDER 
On _______________, _____________________ filed a patent 
infringement claim against ____________________ with the Court with 
regard to the U.S. Patent(s) No. ______________________________. 
This Court subsequently read the public records of the United State Patent 
and Trademark Office with regard to said Patent(s) revealing the first 
named inventor, _______________________, and the recorded 
assignments of __________________________________. As such, the 
Court has concern that this lawsuit might not be grounded upon a 
reasonable inquiry as required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
¶121  This order would stay litigation until the claimant responds, thereby giving the 
accused a temporary reprieve from having to defend against the claim until the claimant 
passes Rule 11 scrutiny. This scrutiny requires that the claimant amend its complaint to 
include 1) a plausible claim construction for each patent claim allegedly infringed, 2) the 
name of the attorney who independently and professionally construed the claim(s), and 3) 
sufficient facts leading to the infringement conclusion or an appropriate reason not to 
include such facts. Importantly, the order need not indicate why the court triggered the 
increased Rule 11 scrutiny, and the claimant may not respond to the order by arguing 
why it should not be categorized as a suspect-class member. Instead, arguments may be 
presented as to the indicia of patent trolling. 
¶122  Because Rule 11 applies to every complaint filed by anyone, Rule 11 requirements 
must be present in all filed complaints. Although the claimant bears a much lower burden 
under the notice-pleading rule, the rule only applies to pleading requirements, not to pre-
litigation investigation. Thus, while leaving out details of factual and/or legal support in 
complaints is permissible, being unable to immediately provide support in response to a 
Rule 11 motion is sanctionable. Although courts might be reluctant to act sua sponte 
because of both the atypical, proactive judicial effort associated with such action and the 
potential embarrassment of reversal on appeal, if courts can act promptly and accurately 
by identifying patent trolling suspect-class members, these concerns might fade. 
E. A Parallel Sua Sponte Rule 11 Motion Approach Based on Improper Purpose: 
Inquiry into Past Conduct 
¶123  Sanctioning parties for using litigation for an improper purpose is an alternative to 
Rule 11 sanctions for failure to perform a reasonable inquiry before filing the patent 
infringement claim. Courts’ analyses for imposing Rule 11 sanctions in patent 
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infringement cases have focused exclusively on the soundness of infringement claims, 
thereby neglecting the improper-purpose clause. Nonetheless, similar to the pre-filing 
inquiry, district courts can immediately implement the improper-purpose clause 
approach. 
¶124  Federal courts can dismiss any complaint that shows improper purpose pursuant to 
Rule 11.222 Courts may rightfully disfavor plaintiffs who use harassing tactics during 
Rule 11 motion hearings, as the reasonable inquiry is not based solely on the claimant’s 
investigative conduct, but also on circumstances that indicate bad faith.223 A finding of 
improper purpose is very fact-specific, and thus courts should make their findings on a 
case-by-case basis. In fact, courts may rely on a wealth of precedent when determining 
whether certain conduct is improper under the circumstances.224 
¶125  Anytime a court thinks it has encountered a patent-trolling PAE, it should move 
sua sponte for increased Rule 11 scrutiny based either on the reasonableness of the pre-
filing inquiry or the suspicion of an improper purpose. Rule 11 gives the court the power 
to subpoena. Thus, the court can require claimants to present past cease-and-desist letters 
and past patent infringement complaints filed regarding the patent in the lawsuit. This 
may or may not give courts reason to suspect that the plaintiff is engaging in harassing 
tactics. However, it at least provides patent trolls reason to hesitate before filing a 
complaint against numerous entities. 
F. Goals of the Proposed Sua Sponte Applications of Rule 11 for  
Bad-Faith Patent Infringement Claims 
¶126  By determining the reasonableness of a pre-filing investigation prior to the answer 
stage, a court can inhibit a patent troll’s ability to threaten innocent businesses with the 
possibility of a temporary injunction during litigation. This would significantly disrupt 
the patent troll’s business model, delaying or eliminating the forecast of large legal 
expenditures and the possibility of negative public perception resulting from the 
infringement accusation. 
¶127  While a court cannot substantively discriminate against an entity without statutory 
mandate, it may procedurally subject an entity to higher scrutiny under the same 
substantive legal standard. Whereas the economic consequences of frivolous patent 
litigations are in dispute, the shotgun approach and manipulative licensing offers 
indisputably burden courts by overly encumbering court dockets. Both practices exhaust 
judicial resources and discourage companies from seeking justice by financially 
compelling them to give up without a legal fight. Therefore, by deterring entities from 
threatening the filing of infringement complaints and extracting unwarranted licensing 
 
222 See NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. at 43–44 (noting court’s inherent power to police itself). 
223 See, e.g., Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780, 784 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
224 See, e.g., Q-Pharma, Inc. v. Andrew Jergens Co., 360 F.3d 1295, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (discussing 
that a simple reading of the product label satisfied the Rule 11 inquiry because the plaintiff believed in 
good faith that inclusion of any miniscule amount of the chemical in the product would infringe the patent); 
View Eng’g Inc. v. Robotic Vision Sys., Inc., 208 F.3d 981, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (holding that the sanction 
should be granted because, for the counterclaim, a court order for adequate pre-filing investigation was 
available); Hoffmann-La Roche Inc. v. Invamed Inc., 213 F.3d 1359, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (discussing 
how reverse engineering to analyze the product was known to be impossible in order to determine whether 
it infringes a process claim); Cambridge Prods. Ltd. v. Penn Nutrients Inc., 962 F.2d 1048, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 
1992) (stating that for a process claim, factual inquiry is somewhat relieved). 
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fees, a court can impose justice without substantively discriminating against certain 
parties, such as commercially active entities. 
¶128  Further, courts should not apply the increased scrutiny discriminatorily against any 
specific type of business, including well known PAEs and NPEs. Rather, the criteria for 
imposing increased scrutiny should focus on suppressing the type of conduct that wastes 
judicial resources. 
¶129  This higher scrutiny based on a suspect-classification model allows a court to 
initiate a sua sponte motion at an earlier time, thus shifting the burden of proof to the 
patent infringement claimant prior to when the accused infringer must file an answer. In 
actual practice, however, courts have rarely initiated sua sponte motions. Thus, currently, 
a realistic litigant must initiate a Rule 11 inquiry by filing a motion for Rule 11 sanctions, 
and then must explain why sanctions are justified. This burden of proof makes not only 
the imposition of sanctions difficult, but also gives patent trolls leverage by postponing 
the sanctions to later phases of litigation. Therefore, a court-initiated motion is preferable 
in solving the patent-troll problem because it allows courts to screen for abusive 
pleadings prior to when the accused defendant has to take any action to defend against 
the lawsuit. 
¶130  In addition, because the reasonable inquiry requirements of Rule 11 must be 
satisfied at the time the plaintiff files the complaint, a sua sponte Rule 11 motion can 
precede the answer to the complaint, and accordingly, halt the proceeding before the 
defendant is compelled to act and forced to incur legal expenses. In this way, Rule 11 
sanctions can be used to pre-screen a variety of claimants before progressing into the 
post-complaint stages of patent litigation where legal costs can quickly accrue for 
accused infringers. 
V. RULE 11 PROPOSAL TO POLICE PATENT TROLLING: TYING IT ALL TOGETHER 
¶131  The goal of the proposed sua sponte Rule 11 motion is not to eliminate unlikely-to-
succeed claims that otherwise may be filtered out via motions to dismiss or summary 
judgments. Rather, in an attempt to deter patent trolling, the proposal time shifts judicial 
scrutiny, which prevents defendants from having to incur the legal costs associated with 
baseless claims of patent infringement. Under Rule 11, the independent interpretation of a 
patent claim must be objectively reasonable. And as a matter of law, a frivolous claim 
based on an untenable claim construction would not survive the first reasonable inquiry 
requirement step. Thus, a court would dismiss the claim without prejudice regardless.225 
¶132  A court can also require the claimant to show that the proposed claim construction 
reads on the infringing apparatus or method. If the claimant has not conducted any 
investigation followed by an infringement analysis, the court may dismiss or stay the case 
until the claimant satisfies the reasonable inquiry requirements under Rule 11. Ordinarily, 
PAEs need not meet this burden until after a Markman hearing, by which time the 
defendants must have already expended significant legal costs in producing and 
supporting their own claim constructions and appearing before the court. 
 
225 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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¶133  Furthermore, because contingency-fee lawyers, who prefer quick settlements, direct 
many patent-trolling lawsuits,226 an ex parte Rule 11 hearing at the onset of litigation 
should further deter patent trolling. In other words, fewer incentives for patent-trolling 
lawyers lead to fewer patent trolls in practice. 
¶134  However, courts should be cautious not to overly burden claimants’ access to 
discovery because some infringement claims inevitably need to resort to factual 
investigation. For example, even a dyed-in-the-wool patent troll may properly cease their 
factual inquiry if obtaining the infringing apparatus or its equivalent is unfairly 
burdensome. Under these circumstances, usually dealing with complex technology or 
some other reasonable difficulty, courts should use discretion and allow at least limited 
discovery. Simply stated, some lawsuits brought by bona fide patent trolls may have 
legitimate infringement claims that courts should not deny based merely on the asserting 
entity’s otherwise predatory business model. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
¶135  While nuisance lawsuits are not new, the substantial economic drag created by 
patent trolling makes these lawsuits particularly damaging in an increasingly 
technological society. The patent-trolling problem can generally be defined as the 
practice of attempting to monetize low quality, excessively broad patents solely via 
patent infringement litigation or threats thereof. Unfortunately, all of this comes at the 
expense of innovative entities active in commerce, consumers, and society as a whole. 
¶136  Patent trolling distorts the underlying purpose of the patent system. The most 
lucrative patents for patent trolling are not aligned with the most publically beneficial 
disclosures of technology. Rather, patent trolls select patents that maximize their rent-
seeking behavior. Because patents chosen for patent trolling are often unreasonably broad 
or vague, relate to business methods, or represent proxies for wealthy and/or volume 
infringers, the potential benefits of patent trolling are out of balance with technological 
advancement, which creates an inherent conflict with the patent system’s constitutional 
mandate. In other words, patent trolling’s deleterious impact outweighs any benefits of 
liquidity and remuneration to individual inventors, universities, and startups. In fact, the 
continued success of patent trolls further incents the acquisition of vague and overbroad 
patent claims. 
¶137  This Article delineates criteria to help courts identify certain entities that are 
predisposed to bad-faith patent trolling. Courts are encouraged to impose higher scrutiny 
at an earlier stage of litigation whenever a “suspect class” asserts a patent claim in an 
effort to screen out bad-faith actors before legal costs start piling up on accused 
infringers. Requiring some suspect infringement claimants to show that their claim 
constructions and infringement analyses reasonably read on the infringed apparatuses or 
methods before entering the Markman hearing stage would not create any new burdens 
for parties; the burden on the claimant is only time shifted, not increased. Frontloading 
the plaintiff’s burden should significantly deter patent trolling and protect some accused 
infringers from frivolous claims by members of the suspect class. 
 
226 See Lisa Shuchman, One Year in, a Look at New Ways to Challenge Patents, CORP. COUNSEL (Oct. 
11, 2013), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1202623095271&slreturn=201311 
30212107. 
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¶138  A new rule may sometimes inconvenience those it is designed to help. Litigation is 
often prohibitively expensive for NPEs, some of which are individual inventors or small 
startups with limited resources. Having to satisfy the higher scrutiny proposed in this 
Article might sometimes require additional effort for NPEs asserting patent rights in good 
faith. Introducing a loser-pays, fee-shifting system, however, would greatly burden all 
good-faith NPEs wishing to assert their patent rights with the potentially catastrophic risk 
of not only losing the lawsuit, but also having to pay the opposition’s costs. In addition, 
Rule 11 sanctions are available notwithstanding the absence of an identifiable non-
prevailing party, such as when parties settle litigation out of court.  
¶139  Society already provides patent holders the legal right to collect “toll” fees for 
which patent trolls take advantage. One could argue that this time-honored legal 
arrangement indicates a societal belief that such fees are an essential part of the patent 
system. Similarly, changing the rules, especially those concerning longstanding 
ownership rights, may cause many to fear that more harm than good will result from such 
a change. After all, it is intrinsically unfair to punish someone who relied on clear legal 
rights when deciding to expend resources and adopt a legally sanctioned business model, 
including models that never practice patents, provide services, or sell products. 
¶140  The patent system rests on the idea that a patent is presumptively valid and 
enforceable in order to promote progress and technological innovation. But when a patent 
troll enforces or threatens to enforce a patent, its focus is on exploiting the realities of 
patent litigation to obtain a quick payoff. Still, this might not be economically wasteful 
rent seeking because an inventor, at some point, did in fact put forth the effort to create 
the patented invention. While the government grants patent rights for the public good, 
society and the law cannot categorically ban patent trolling simply because the patented 
technology benefits society. After all, when societal demand is high for a certain product, 
the temptation to infringe that product’s patent naturally corresponds.227 Otherwise, for 
example, if patents rights were easily extinguished, investment for research and 
development of many pharmaceutical drugs would likely never occur. Similarly, many of 
the various legislative proposals mentioned supra Part II might unintentionally weaken 
the enforcement of non-frivolous patent infringement claims and/or diminish 
remuneration to individual inventors, failed startup companies, and universities that 
might have otherwise promoted the original inventive activities and necessary risk taking. 
¶141  What can society do about the patent-trolling problem? No one would support 
destroying a useful bridge to stop trolls from robbing travelers that cross the bridge. 
Similarly, and more realistically, courts should not support extortionary conduct by 
denying defendants an easier way to escape untenable patent infringement claims. A 
patent purchaser may commercialize the technology, engage in patent trolling, or turn 
around and sell it. Only the choice to engage in patent trolling should trigger further 
scrutiny into the claimant’s intent, and as explained in this Article, courts should apply 
this scrutiny regardless of an entity’s status or commercial attributes. 
¶142  This Article posits that an increased and systemic use of sua sponte Rule 11 
motions could punish patent trolls for bringing exploitative lawsuits and thus deter 
patent-trolling behavior in general. The drafters of Rule 11 provided built-in judicial 
discretion for sua sponte motions that allows for a flexible rule based on equitable 
 
227 See supra notes 62–73 and accompanying text. 
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factors, as opposed to a compulsory sanction for those ambiguously defined as patent 
trolls. The flexible nuances of judicial discretion allow for an approach that is better 
equipped to handle unique patent-trolling behavior, the evolving exploitation of legal 
inefficiencies, and most importantly, the difficulty in defining a patent troll in statutory 
language, which could easily be gamed.228 Instead of merely categorizing entities by 
commercial characteristics or NPE status, justifiable sanctions will inevitably result if 
courts use objective indicia as a readily discernible proxy for an NPE’s subjective intent 
behind filing a claim. 
¶143  Admittedly, this approach might prompt courts to subject good-faith claimants to 
Rule 11 hearings. Alternatively, the increased prevalence of Rule 11 sanctions might 
discourage some claimants from filing meritorious complaints due to the uncertainty of 
whether they have met the Rule 11 requirements. Ultimately, though, this approach can 
provide equitable results if courts proactively initiate Rule 11 hearings because extended 
litigation costs far more than increased scrutiny. This cost differential affects not only 
parties to the litigation, but society as a whole.  
¶144  Patent trolls impede technological development and commercialization just as 
mythical trolls hinder travel and increase its cost. If it would cost more to remove the 
trolls from under the bridge, as opposed to simply paying the troll-toll fees, no one would 
individually choose to remove the trolls. Patent trolls demand license fees that are too 
small to justify expending even preliminary litigation costs to prove the illegitimacy of 
the claim. Thus, currently, defendants have little incentive to fight the troll and drive it 
away from the bridge. Hopefully, though, the judiciary can exercise its inherent powers 
and join the melee to easily shield defendants from incurring legal costs until the patent 
infringement claimant can pass scrutiny. 
¶145  More broadly, the very existence of a quick and cheap “off-ramp” prior to the 
answer stage during patent litigation can significantly deter patent trolling. 229 Rule 11 
provides a safe harbor for defendants to escape patent infringement lawsuits at the 
earliest time possible, avoiding legal expenses by obtaining a complaint dismissal. “If a 
troll knows he can no longer trap a defendant in expensive and lengthy litigation, his 
interest in the suit will diminish substantially,” and the amount of the payoff that can 
reasonably be demanded will decrease.230  
¶146  Ultimately, former Chief Judge Rader said it best: 
 The onslaught of litigation brought by “patent trolls” . . . has 
slowed the development of new products, increased costs for businesses 
and consumers, and clogged our judicial system. 
 . . . . 
 
228 See Hearing on H.R. 3309 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (testimony of 
David Kappos, Former Director, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office), available at http://judiciary.house. 
gov/_files/hearings/113th/10292013/Kappos%20Testimony.pdf  (“[C]onsideration should be given to 
reducing prescription to a minimum, and tasking the judiciary with the detailed work needed to turn broad 
legislative guidance into properly calibrated court procedure.”).  
229 See Charles E. Schumer, A Strategy for Combating Patent Trolls, WALL ST. J. (June 12, 2013), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887323844804578531021238656366. 
230 Id. 
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 Lost in the debate, however, is that judges already have the 
authority to curtail these practices: they can make trolls pay for abusive 
litigation.  
 . . . .  
 Judges know the routine all too well, and the law gives them the 
authority to stop it. We urge them to do so.231 
 
 
231 Rader Op-Ed., supra note 2. 
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